In this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR...Show moreIn this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR should instead be thought of as a different type of quality. On my account, moral responsibility is an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to agents. I establish firstly four desiderata used to evaluate the adequacy of any theory of moral responsibility. Using these, I argue that neither libertarian nor compatibilist theories of free will provide a sure bulwark of moral responsibility as a property. This, combined with the rationale involving the problematic nature of this property, leads me to a conclusion similar to that of the hard determinist: the property of moral responsibility cannot exist. However, in order to avoid responsibility nihilism that follows from this moral responsibility scepticism, I propose that MR may exist as an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to human and non-human agents by following fair rules. Finally, I opt to explain why such account of attributive moral responsibility (AMR) provides a more adequate response to the desiderata than rival accounts.Show less