In this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible...Show moreIn this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible concepts of freedom: radical and limited. Radical freedom is spontaneous and identical to the agent's own act. It is founded on undetermined intelligibility and stands outside the theological system's domain. Limited freedom is a decided intelligibility that one-sidedly determines human actions. It is located within the domain of the theological system and meets its requirements. I will make the case that these two concepts of freedom are vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. First, I shall argue that equating radical freedom with the agent's own act does not provide determinacy for this concept of freedom. Second, I shall contend that the agent's decision on her intelligibility in limited freedom is undetermined, which consequently renders this freedom undetermined. I will suggest the source of Schelling's oscillation in the Freedom Essay is the existence of two incompatible tendencies: a commitment to provide a concept of freedom with unlimited power, and to indwell that freedom in an ordered theological system. I maintain that the simultaneous fulfilment of these two tasks is impossible.Show less