Natural disasters pose a unique threat to authoritarian regimes because they can bring existing failures within the structure of governance into sharp relief, thus legitimising the grievances of...Show moreNatural disasters pose a unique threat to authoritarian regimes because they can bring existing failures within the structure of governance into sharp relief, thus legitimising the grievances of rebel groups and increasing the risk of civil conflict. Most regimes therefore attempt to ensure humanitarian aid is secured and distributed, to mitigate such damages. Why then, do some regimes obstruct or deny humanitarian aid if doing so may incur costs to the regime? This thesis solves this puzzle by investigating the cases of the Bhola Cyclone in East Pakistan in 1970 and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 and assessing whether each of four key factors were observable in either case. The four factors are: ethnic and ideological differences; a fear of foreign intervention; elite rivalry; and the exit strategy of the military dictator. This analysis leads to several interesting conclusions. First, ethnic or ideological differences are not enough motivation for a regime to incur the costs of obstructing aid. Second, regimes will deny or obstruct foreign aid if they believe doing so will lead to a decreased risk of civil conflict. Third, elite rivalry may manipulate the regime’s leadership into acting against its own best interests. Finally, authoritarian leaders will prioritise their own exit strategy over the need to prevent untold numbers of civilian deaths.Show less
In this dissertation, an integrated theory is proposed in order to test why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings during counterinsurgency operations. The current state of research is...Show moreIn this dissertation, an integrated theory is proposed in order to test why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings during counterinsurgency operations. The current state of research is limited, scholars who studied the phenomenon either stuck to explaining parts or lacked the necessary overview of factors that can lead to mass killings in counterinsurgency operations. Within this research, three strands of literature that relate to either mass killings, authoritarian counterinsurgency or counterinsurgency in general are proposed that provide competing answers to the research objective. Subsequently, this integrated body of literature is applied to three cases: Iraq, Guatemala and the Soviet Union. The findings show that the threats stemming from the insurgents, and in this conceptualization more specifically the nature of the insurgency, the regime crisis as a result of the insurgency and the dysfunctionality of previous conventional measures provide the most feasible explanations for why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings. Additional value is attributed to both veto player interests and elite ideology in determining authoritarian decision-making in the light of draconian counterinsurgency measures. The research moreover shows that the respective reasons to engage in mass killings influence and sometimes enforce each other.Show less
Advanced master thesis | Political Science (Advanced Master)
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This thesis assesses the notion that liberal democracies make inherently poor counterinsurgents by conducting a most similar case comparison of the Algerian War (1954- 1962) and the Second Chechen...Show moreThis thesis assesses the notion that liberal democracies make inherently poor counterinsurgents by conducting a most similar case comparison of the Algerian War (1954- 1962) and the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). By comparing two cases where prominent variables were common, other than regime type and case outcome, this paper was able to determine that regime type does matter in small wars. Although both counterinsurgents were able to achieve military success through brutality, regime type was ultimately consequential to the outcomes of the small wars. Whereas the more authoritarian state (Russia) was relatively unimpeded in its war effort, the democratic state (France) ultimately lost the war due to the freedom of the media and its democratic institutions. In France, the media exposed the barbarisms of the army, generating condemnation at both domestic and international levels. This opposition to the war effort would prove insurmountable to the democratic state. Through coercion, France sought to suppress domestic criticism, but in doing so, eroded the democratic virtue of the state. Ultimately faced with the option of either preserving democracy or maintaining the brutal, but effective, counterinsurgency, France capitulated, ending its colonial rule in Algeria. Russia, on the other hand, was never held accountable due to an aggressive information operations campaign that precluded the war effort from becoming a prominent public issue. As the suppression of public criticism is unavailable to democratic states, democracies are found to be inherently less proficient at counterinsurgency.Show less
