Why do armed non-state groups initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war? In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace...Show moreWhy do armed non-state groups initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war? In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace agreements with power-sharing arrangements have long been argued to be the best civil war resolution, as a result, these have become a default tool in civil war resolution. However, in more than half of these cases, civil war did recur. Empirical research shows that power-sharing is indeed successful in stabilizing peace among former adversaries. The answer to why civil wars terminated by negotiated settlements with power-sharing start again is likely to be found within the groups included in the settlement. The problem is not so much the resolution of hostilities between (former) foes, but rather the rise of hostilities among former allies. This thesis argues that power-sharing might (temporarily) establish a balance of power between former adversaries, at the same time it negatively affects the balance of power within the groups, causing intra-group security dilemmas and rivalry leading to remobilization and initiation of conflict. This theoretical proposal is tested in a qualitative study of post-civil war Sudan and Tajikistan, by questioning how power-sharing affected the internal dynamics of the rebel groups. What made rebel groups initiate conflict again, or, why did they not?Show less
