Scholars tend to agree that moderation of radical groups stems from inclusionary tactics in the democratic process. However, there is evidence that counterinsurgency measures and exclusion could...Show moreScholars tend to agree that moderation of radical groups stems from inclusionary tactics in the democratic process. However, there is evidence that counterinsurgency measures and exclusion could also facilitate moderation. Therefore, this paper asks: ‘How do foreign counterinsurgency measures facilitate moderation of radical groups?’ The case study of the Lebanese Islamist group Hizballah, the Party of God, will be used to test the theory on collective angst, fear, and survival concerns resulting from counterinsurgency measures. Through a qualitative approach of applying process tracing to primary and secondary sources, this paper finds support for the argument that collective angst as a result of foreign counterinsurgency results in radical groups moderating their ideology.Show less
Somalia and Nigeria have been struggling economically and politically in the past decades, mainly due to the rise of the insurgent groups Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. The counterinsurgency efforts by...Show moreSomalia and Nigeria have been struggling economically and politically in the past decades, mainly due to the rise of the insurgent groups Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. The counterinsurgency efforts by both the Somali and the Nigerian government have been a topic of debate since the start of the conflict, discussing recommendations and best practices to bring back peace and prosperity in the region. This study, however, aimed to shift this debate to discuss the effectiveness of their counterinsurgency strategies, while focusing heavily on context. Thus, analyzing the contextual factors of Somalia and Nigeria through several dimensions has resulted in an understanding of how the context influences the outcome. These dimensions are economics, domestic politics and international politics. The findings of this research show that Somalia lacks the funds, political willingness and functioning governmental institutions to effectively engage in non-military counterinsurgency. However, due to international assistance, their military efforts to fight Al-Shabaab have been more successful. On the other hand, Nigeria has a stronger economy and more organized government, but faces the issue of unhappiness among the population leading to a rise in insurgency recruitment. Developmental and humanitarian aid provided by the international community can help the country in the long-term, as long as the unrest within the population is resolved.Show less
In this dissertation, an integrated theory is proposed in order to test why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings during counterinsurgency operations. The current state of research is...Show moreIn this dissertation, an integrated theory is proposed in order to test why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings during counterinsurgency operations. The current state of research is limited, scholars who studied the phenomenon either stuck to explaining parts or lacked the necessary overview of factors that can lead to mass killings in counterinsurgency operations. Within this research, three strands of literature that relate to either mass killings, authoritarian counterinsurgency or counterinsurgency in general are proposed that provide competing answers to the research objective. Subsequently, this integrated body of literature is applied to three cases: Iraq, Guatemala and the Soviet Union. The findings show that the threats stemming from the insurgents, and in this conceptualization more specifically the nature of the insurgency, the regime crisis as a result of the insurgency and the dysfunctionality of previous conventional measures provide the most feasible explanations for why authoritarian regimes engage in mass killings. Additional value is attributed to both veto player interests and elite ideology in determining authoritarian decision-making in the light of draconian counterinsurgency measures. The research moreover shows that the respective reasons to engage in mass killings influence and sometimes enforce each other.Show less
Questions why Nigeria's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency actions have not been overly successful, particularly in the case of Boko Haram. This is done by comparing their actions against a...Show moreQuestions why Nigeria's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency actions have not been overly successful, particularly in the case of Boko Haram. This is done by comparing their actions against a theoretical framework built on academic literature pertaining to successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies.Show less
The Russian counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya from late 1999 has been typical for the authoritarian model of counterinsurgency and demonstrates the authoritarian inclinations and mindset of...Show moreThe Russian counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya from late 1999 has been typical for the authoritarian model of counterinsurgency and demonstrates the authoritarian inclinations and mindset of the Putin regime. Instead of increasing government legitimacy, winning the Chechen population's 'hearts and minds' and in this way realising a durable solution to the Chechen conflict, the Putin administration relied mainly on at first mostly indiscriminate and later more selective violence and repression, for which it relied on an indigenous counterinsurgency force under the command of the Kadyrovs, in order to coerce the Chechens in compliance. At the same time, the Putin administration placed a lot of effort in preventing the national will to continue fighting in Chechnya from eroding by making the Chechen conflict invisible, creating the impression of normalisation and reducing Russian casualties. To this end, the Kremlin tried to reduce the freedom of the press and bring the media and civil society, which it viewed as a threat to its war effort, under its control, while at the same time it increasingly came to rely on its Chechen proxies, who in the mid-2000s took over the brunt of the counterinsurgency operations from the Russian military. Thus, although the Putin regime in the early 2000s was still regarded as a 'hybrid' or 'transitional' regime, the Russian counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya from late 1999 demonstrates that Putin and the members of his inner circle from the start viewed democracy, free media and a strong and vibrant civil society as threats to their ability to govern, their war effort in Chechnya and their own positions.Show less
Deze scriptie heeft middels een casestudy de regentschappen Probolinggo en Loemadjang op Oost-Java onderzocht op welke wijze de Nederlandse civiele en militaire autoriteiten, in het eerste jaar na...Show moreDeze scriptie heeft middels een casestudy de regentschappen Probolinggo en Loemadjang op Oost-Java onderzocht op welke wijze de Nederlandse civiele en militaire autoriteiten, in het eerste jaar na de Eerste Politionele Actie, samenwerking met lokale machthebbers probeerden te bewerkstelligen. Samenwerking was hierbij geen einddoel op zich, maar een middel om indirecte controle over de bevolking te krijgen tijdens de Nederlandse counterinsurgency-campagne. De aandacht van Nederlandse autoriteiten ging uit naar twee typen lokale leiders: bestuurders en religieuze leiders. Deze scriptie brengt de middelen in kaart waarmee Nederlandse autoriteiten de Indonesische machthebbers aan zich bonden en de manieren waarop zij met het tekort aan Indonesisch personeel omgingen. Daarnaast heeft dit onderzoek de belemmerende factoren in dit samenwerkingsproces geïdentificeerd.Show less
