This thesis aimed to find what measures were introduced by the Dutch government and the United Kingdom government against COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation. Policy papers from the Dutch...Show moreThis thesis aimed to find what measures were introduced by the Dutch government and the United Kingdom government against COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation. Policy papers from the Dutch and United Kingdom governments’ websites were studied with a content analysis through the OECD framework for creating policy responses to combat disinformation. The OECD framework consists of four policy areas: Public communication efforts, Direct responses to disinformation, Regulatory and legal responses and Media and civic responses. The research concluded that both the Dutch government and the United Kingdom government used similar policies and measures to counter COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Dutch governments covered all four policy areas of the OECD framework. However, there were differences in the policy implementation between the two countries: compared to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom introduced more Regulatory and legal responses, and put more effort in approaching difficult-to-reach target groups. Despite the ongoing Infodemic impacting public health, the two governments were still careful not to breach the rights of the freedom of speech by their measures against COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation.Show less
At present, the study of disinformation remains relatively confined to personality-oriented and technologically deterministic approaches in the context of white nationalist populism or Trump...Show moreAt present, the study of disinformation remains relatively confined to personality-oriented and technologically deterministic approaches in the context of white nationalist populism or Trump cronyism. Guided by Actor-Network Theory’s translation process, this thesis builds on ethnographically grounded and comparative research on disinformation producers in the Philippines as it looks at the two most recent presidential elections in 2016 and 2022. Drawing from netnographic observations across social media platforms Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Twitter, as well as published media interviews, I propose that disinformation networks under Rodrigo Duterte and Bongbong Marcos proved deeply complex, hierarchic and exploitative. The empirical material illustrates how different actors came together under one voice, mobilising a network of entities to promote each presidential candidate’s election. By making visible the organisational relations and labour arrangments underpinning political disinformation campaigns, as well as the mechanisms of control exercised over them, the following paper aims to deepen an understanding of these harmful networks in order to prevent their future occurrence.Show less
My analysis provides little support for the claim that Instagram’s algorithm is exploited in an attempt to increase the exposure to RNQs’ content/narratives or instill users with a fake sense of...Show moreMy analysis provides little support for the claim that Instagram’s algorithm is exploited in an attempt to increase the exposure to RNQs’ content/narratives or instill users with a fake sense of organic support, by employing bots to amplify their messages and enlarge their following. Although at first glance, it appears like bots make up a substantial amount of their followers, compared to other established media, their number is not significant, but rather a representation of the overall inauthentic bot population on the SMP. Among the inspected outlets, only the Italian outlet “ilGiornale” exhibited abnormal metrics throughout all steps of the analysis and is therefore considered to benefit from CP methods. Since this RNQ has not uploaded any content to Instagram since May 2019 and only has 16 posts in total, an increased exposure to their content is considered to be no threat to democratic deliberation. Rather, even without CP, it is an emerging right-wing media ecosystem that poses an increasing challenge to EU democracy. These findings, however, should be taken cautiously, as in the course of the empirical chapter, it becomes obvious that qualitative bot-detection models were designed for Twitter or Facebook and do not adequately take the platform-specifics of Instagram into account. Hence, the number of bots and subsequently the number of RNQ accounts that benefit from CP might actually be higher than this analysis suggests.Show less
This thesis deals with the role of Vkontakte in the narrative creation around the referendum of Crimea, March 2014. Through a detailed study of political and non-political VK content of the 6-week...Show moreThis thesis deals with the role of Vkontakte in the narrative creation around the referendum of Crimea, March 2014. Through a detailed study of political and non-political VK content of the 6-week period around the referendum, the thesis discusses the themes, methods of information campaigning, as well as the government's involvement in the discourse formation.Show less
