The question of whether wealthier states should give aid to developing states is on the agenda of most political debates and is also highly discussed in the academic world. Within the luck...Show moreThe question of whether wealthier states should give aid to developing states is on the agenda of most political debates and is also highly discussed in the academic world. Within the luck-egalitarian theory, scholars disagree about whether the wealthier states are causing, at least partly, poverty within the developing states. This research will provide a normative answer to the question of whether wealthier states are morally obligated to provide distributive justice towards developing states. The crux of this essay involves the question of whether poverty is, at least partly, a form of brute luck imposed upon the developing states by the wealthier states. To conclude, this thesis claims that by abusing their borrowing privilege and resourcing privilege, the wealthier states are, at least partly, responsible for the plight of the developing states and therefore are morally obligated to provide distributive justice towards the developing states.Show less
One of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1...Show moreOne of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1 are only applicable in domestic set-tings while cosmopolitans argue for a broader nonrelationist applicability of these principles in the international sphere. I will acknowledge that the state has normative peculiarity but also claim that there are other grounds of justice, both relational and nonrelational, that plea for more demanding general obligations of justice towards other peoples or states. These duties are based on principles of justice since they are more stringent and en-forceable than current statist views on foreign policies. I will oppose the narrow statist view and argue instead for a broader application of principles of justice. Relying on grounds or domains of justice allows us to leave the unilateral discussion between relationists (statists) and nonrelationists (cosmopolitans) for both do not succeed in capturing an accurate, complete account of international justice. Distinguishing different grounds of justice will show how the exact nature of a relationship determines what principles of justice are applicable for which agents. I will also show how this alternative approach is helpful in the challenging debate of noncompliance and questions on who is to pick up the slack that is left by noncomplying agents. The main argument I will thus make is that liberal statists have reasons to endorse more demanding international duties of justice. My aim is twofold: first to show inconsistencies in statist theory and second to explain how statist approaches are compatible with endorsing other, more demanding duties of global justice.Show less
