This thesis examines how brain drain can be problematized in light of relational egalitarianism. This approach views the existing economy as that of joint production as it relies heavily on mutual...Show moreThis thesis examines how brain drain can be problematized in light of relational egalitarianism. This approach views the existing economy as that of joint production as it relies heavily on mutual dependency between citizens. Here, it aims to find whether the moral duty citizens hold towards one another can legitimately place restrictions on freedom of movement in the case of brain drain. Through taking relational egalitarianism to its normative furthests, it becomes clear that the right to exit can legitimately be constricted.Show less
The principle that persons are entitled to the fruits of their labour is a central facet of both libertarian and Marxist theories, as well as a commonly shared intuition in political debate. It is...Show moreThe principle that persons are entitled to the fruits of their labour is a central facet of both libertarian and Marxist theories, as well as a commonly shared intuition in political debate. It is often derived from self-ownership. This thesis argues that such a derivation is invalid because it rests upon an equivocation of the concept of ownership. It is possible that persons have certain ‘property relations’ to themselves, but not others: the right to possess and manage themselves, but not a full right to the income generated by their assets or capital value. The thesis defends such a non-libertarian view of self-ownership. A qualified version of the labour theory of property acquisition can be saved by appealing not directly to self-ownership but to the related argument from personal identity, which says that actors have a personal connection to their labour, which generates a prima facie right to the fruits of one’s labour. Combined with desert considerations that arise due to the positive moral value from contributing to the world through labour, this can become an actual right. Such desert considerations should track responsibility in accordance with luck egalitarian principles.Show less
Our economic activities have great effect on the life sustaining systems of our earth. The prevention of rising above a critical ecological ceiling is an important social goal. Simultaneously, a...Show moreOur economic activities have great effect on the life sustaining systems of our earth. The prevention of rising above a critical ecological ceiling is an important social goal. Simultaneously, a focus on providing all people with a social foundation should be a central endeavour. These goals are inextricably linked; a breach of the ecological ceiling, through human activity, has detrimental effects on the social foundation. In my analysis of these issues in the areas of philosophy and economics I have arrived at the following requirements, which serve as an addendum to Rawls’ principles of justice and his just savings principle. In order to aid the pursuit of intergenerational justice, in particular in the face of anthropogenic climate change, we should: 1. adopt a positive savings rate, so as to explicitly define the obligation to focus our policies on providing for the least well-off transgenerationally; 2. adopt a policy of agnostic growth, where we focus on good climate policy instead of steering for growth, allowing for a Pareto-efficient balance between growth and social welfare from the economic production processes, and 3. embed these policies in circular economy, where resources are protected and a sustainable social environment is nurtured.Show less
Dworkin’s non-ideal theory of justice has been criticized for its lack of practical guidance and for being insufficiently consistent with the normative framework developed in his ideal theory. The...Show moreDworkin’s non-ideal theory of justice has been criticized for its lack of practical guidance and for being insufficiently consistent with the normative framework developed in his ideal theory. The ideal/non-ideal distinction has gotten a lot of attention in the past decades and recent literature points to the need to focus on the implementation of theories of justice in non-ideal circumstances (Wolff, 1998; Anderson, 1999; Arneson, 2000; Farelly, 2007; Swift, 2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Robeyns, 2008). Is there a way in which we can overcome the criticism of Dworkin and live up to the demand of a satisfying theory of justice that has a coherent and sound ideal and non-ideal component? By critically analysing the primary problems residing in either the ideal-, non-ideal theory or the relation between them I will aim to identify the main obstacles to the solvation of the ideal/non-ideal dichotomy. First of all I will argue that ideal- and non-ideal theory each have a distinct value and that their strength can be combined to realize a complete and satisfactory theory of justice. Subsequently, Dworkin’s ideal and non-ideal theory will be set forth in order to find out which aspects are problematic. Thereafter, in the following order, four different objections will be discussed resulting in four claims about Dworkin’s theory of justice. First of all the ‘shameful revelation’ objection will be addressed that claims any non-ideal implementation of Dworkin’s ideal theory will lead to immoral implications. Secondly, bad idealization will be exposed that allegedly obstruct the translation from ideal- to non-ideal theory. Thirdly, the negative impact of the controversial place of liberty in Dworkin’s ideal theory will be discussed. And finally the interpretation of the equity deficit in Dworkin’s asserted insufficient non-ideal theory of improvement will be scrutinized. In the end each claim tells us something about the way in which the apparent dichotomy between ideal- and non-ideal theory in Dworkin’s theory of justice can be resolved and lays out the first baby steps towards an improved and more coherent Dworkian theory of justice.Show less
