This thesis examines the evolution of the constructs of gender and sexuality in precolonial, colonial, and independent Zimbabwe and Botswana, with focus on the Shona, Ndebele, and Tswana during the...Show moreThis thesis examines the evolution of the constructs of gender and sexuality in precolonial, colonial, and independent Zimbabwe and Botswana, with focus on the Shona, Ndebele, and Tswana during the (pre)colonial era, and the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) and ZANU(PF) (Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front) in the late colonial and postcolonial period, to identify what particularities in Botswana’s and Zimbabwe’s historical trajectories explain the divergence between the stance of BDP and ZANU(PF) leadership on the decriminalization of same-sex relations (SSR). The Shona, Ndebele, and Tswana started with a similar outlook on SSR, and in both countries, the British colonial administration imposed penal codes that criminalize(d) SSR. Yet, while BDP leadership grew gradually more supportive of the eventual decriminalization of SSR in 2019, ZANU(PF) leadership has strongly opposed to repealing the colonial-era penal codes. The different (de)colonization process and degree of colonial domination in each country appear to have the strongest explanatory power for these diverging outcomes. Many scholars have linked homophobia to masculinity and patriarchy. At the same time, colonial rule is widely believed to have undermined African masculinities and destabilized existing gender roles, and scholars have argued that misogyny, hyper-masculinity, and homophobia in African nationalist movements can be seen as a reaction to feelings of emasculation among African men. Colonial rule was significantly less invasive in Botswana, and the transition to independence mostly peaceful. Resultantly, there was no strong feeling of colonial domination among Botswanans, and anti-(neo)colonial rhetoric had little value as a source of political support. Thus, homosexuality never became conflated with (neo)colonialism in BDP nationalism, because it never centered on anti-(neo)colonialism to begin with. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s invasive colonial experience and arduous independence struggle created a strong sense of colonial domination among male independence leaders, who experienced it as ‘emasculation,’ and used misogyny and homophobia in attempt to restore a position of patriarchal power. At the same time, the rejection of homosexuality became a way to challenge colonial narratives about African sexuality and masculinity that were used to justify their abasement. Resultantly, the conflation of emasculation and homosexuality with colonial subjugation featured prominently in ZANU(PF)’s anti-colonial nationalism. The influence of Fanonesque and Marxist-Leninist thought further deepened homophobic sentiments in ZANU(PF) nationalism, while these schools of thought were absent from BDP nationalism. There is also scholarly consensus that European missionaries played an active role in codifying homosexuality as ‘immoral’ in Africa, and scholars argue that as Christianity became heavily politicized in the region, so did homosexuality. In that sense, homophobia, much like Christianity, is a political tool in contemporary Africa. Limited imposition of colonial rule and Tswana-controlled integration of Christianity may have further limited the inculcation of European (missionary) notions of sexuality and immorality in BDP nationalism. Moreover, unlike BDP nationalism, ZANU(PF) nationalism was organized around anti-colonialism, and this social glue lost its power once independence was achieved. This necessitated the creation of a new common enemy, while socioeconomic underperformance and declining public support incentivized the creation of a scapegoat to deflect criticism. Political homophobia became part of the creation of this new common enemy and scapegoat, and gained its legitimacy from Zimbabwe’s (de)colonization experience. With steady economic development and widespread public support after independence, there was less of an incentive for the BDP to use sexual minorities as a scapegoat.Show less
This thesis aims to answer the question of why the Indonesian state has increasingly securitized LGBT people in Indonesia from 2000 to 2016, by focusing on two factors: public homophobia and state...Show moreThis thesis aims to answer the question of why the Indonesian state has increasingly securitized LGBT people in Indonesia from 2000 to 2016, by focusing on two factors: public homophobia and state homophobia. Data on public attitudes toward the LGBT community in Indonesia will be drawn from various surveys conducted after 2000s. These surveys measure attitudes on existing heteronormative ideals in Indonesian society and capture the conservative turn starting from 1998 during the post-democratic transition period. The increasing threat of homosexuality as propagated by the Indonesian state will be historically and systematically analyzed through a number of statements made by political elites. Strong evidence is found on public and state homophobia increasing in Indonesia and this materializing politically and legally.Show less
