This case study analysis presents an analysis of the coordination between BOAs (municipal law enforcement officers) and the national police in the municipality of Vlissingen, in the southwest of...Show moreThis case study analysis presents an analysis of the coordination between BOAs (municipal law enforcement officers) and the national police in the municipality of Vlissingen, in the southwest of the Netherlands. The relationship between these actors in this form of plural policing will be determined through a theoretical framework that is adapted from the studies by Rice (2019) and O’Neill et al. (2022), which have provided variables to research if there is a junior or an equal partnership of coordination. Therefore, the research question is: How can the current coordination between the National Police and BOAs in Vlissingen be described? Through a combination of the qualitative research methods of document analysis and interview analysis, this study aims to investigate the dynamics and challenges associated with the cooperation of BOAs and the police in Vlissingen. The results show that in some areas we can consider an equal partnership and, in other areas, a junior one. The more the BOAs in Vlissingen professionalize, the more equal the partnership will become. Future research has the opportunity to draw more attention to the urgency of the professionalisation of BOAs and the impact this has on community policing in different regions of the Netherlands.Show less
Master thesis | Crisis and Security Management (MSc)
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De AIVD en MIVD nemen uit hoofde van hun taak in het belang van de nationale veiligheid regelmatig strafbaar gedrag waar, maar maken daarvan niet altijd melding bij de opsporingsautoriteiten. Ze...Show moreDe AIVD en MIVD nemen uit hoofde van hun taak in het belang van de nationale veiligheid regelmatig strafbaar gedrag waar, maar maken daarvan niet altijd melding bij de opsporingsautoriteiten. Ze zijn weliswaar verplicht om hun bronnen, methoden en kennisniveau af te schermen, maar dat verklaart niet waarom zij hun discretionaire bevoegdheid om het te melden, in de woorden van een AIVD-hoofd, ‘soms wel en soms niet’ gebruiken. Met deze studie is geprobeerd om in kaart te brengen wat zo’n inlichtingen- en/of veiligheidsdienst (verder: dienst) tot verstrekking van inlichtingen aan justitie drijft, en wat hem daarvan weerhoudt. Derhalve is de hypothese - dat diensten slechts verstrekken met het oogmerk om de aan hen gestelde taak en behoeftes te bevorderen - getoetst, en is geprobeerd andere drijfveren af te leiden. Hiertoe zijn getuigenverklaringen van oud-diensthoofden en ruim 500 ambtsberichten geanalyseerd, en zijn vraaggesprekken met betrokken ambtenaren gevoerd. Ter contextualisering is aan de hand van haar wetsgeschiedenis de institutionele verhouding tussen inlichtingen en opsporing in Nederland geschetst. Uit het onderzoek volgt dat de AIVD noch de MIVD een eenduidig verstrekkingsbeleid heeft of beleeft, en dat de hypothese te rigide is: Hoewel er ter bevordering van de nationale veiligheid verstrekt wordt, kan ook of slechts zijn beoogd om een ander belang te dienen. Zo kan zij door politieke of technocratische prikkels gedreven worden. De afdelingsculturen en het geweten van individuele medewerkers bepalen of verstrekking van inlichtingen wegens niets dan hun strafvorderlijke relevantie überhaupt overwogen wordt. Ingeval deze conclusie als problematisch zou worden gezien, wat omwille van het voorzienbaarheidsbeginsel voorstelbaar is, wordt aangeraden om niet tot verstrekking te verplichten, maar hooguit voor te schrijven in welke gevallen verstrekking overwogen dient te worden. / The Netherlands’ intelligence and security services AIVD and MIVD regularly witness, by virtue of their task in the interest of national security, crimes; crimes they do not always report to the criminal justice authorities. Although they are obliged to shield their sources, methods and knowledge level, this does not explain why they, in the words of a former AIVD-chief, ‘sometimes do and sometimes do not’ use their discretionary competence to report. This study tried to map by which variables an intelligence and/or security service (further: service) is driven towards reporting such intelligence, and which restrain him from it. Therefore, the hypothesis - that services disseminate only for the purpose of advancing their set task and requirements - was tested and was tried to deduce other drivers. Hereto, witness testimonies of former intelligence chiefs and some 500 intelligence products were analysed. Moreover, involved civil servants were interviewed. For contextualisation, the institutional relation between intelligence and law enforcement in the Netherlands was drawn by assessing its parliamentary history. This research shows that neither the AIVD nor the MIVD maintains a clear dissemination policy, and that the hypothesis is too rigid: Although intelligence is indeed disseminated for the purpose of fostering national security, it is done also or sorely for the sake of other interests. Thus, dissemination could be driven by political or technocratic incentives. The organisational cultures and the conscience of individual officers determine whether reporting of intelligence for no reason but its prosecutorial relevance is considered at all. In case this conclusion is viewed as problematic, which is understandable in light of the principle of foreseeability, it is recommended to - at most - prescribe the conditions in which reporting should be considered, instead of obliging dissemination.Show less
