Value in nature has often been studied from two perspectives, either externally or internally. Schools of intrinsic value like deep ecology have been found extreme in the past, their implications...Show moreValue in nature has often been studied from two perspectives, either externally or internally. Schools of intrinsic value like deep ecology have been found extreme in the past, their implications undesirable to humans. External perspectives like anthropocentric value judgements, for example ecosystem-service arguments, or considerations of intergenerational justice have become increasingly common and well researched. However, this thesis starts from the observation that anthropocentric value based morality does little to protect ecosystems for their own sake. Instead, it merely focuses on those parts that either appeal, service, or otherwise are useful to humans. It is especially this perception of ecosystems that lies at the root of current and past exploitation of the ecosystem. The result is nearly irreversible damage to the ecosystem. This thesis argues for pro tanto moral rights for the ecosystem, on the basis of interest-based moral considerability. I will show that previous arguments for or against the moral considerability of nature lack sufficient knowledge of ecological processes. If ecological processes are properly understood, the ecosystem can be said to have an interest. This interest, or wellbeing, is the striving towards homeostasis. This means that the ecosystem has moral considerability and is a moral patient. It is therefore eligible for moral rights. These rights-relations occur between moral agents and moral patient when there is contact. This will be explained through developing the Contact-Theory.Show less
