The (hypothetical) deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) challenges the way in which we conceptualize moral responsibility. The emergence of LAWs have added an autonomously acting non...Show moreThe (hypothetical) deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) challenges the way in which we conceptualize moral responsibility. The emergence of LAWs have added an autonomously acting non-human entity to a moral responsibility framework which is inextricably linked to human nature and moral capacity, which LAWs neither have nor possess. This leaves open a responsibility gap in which it becomes unclear who exactly is responsible for the outcome of the decisions made by LAWs. Although several solutions have been proposed to solve the gap, such as the concept of meaningful control or role-specific responsibility, I find that they cannot sufficiently address the responsibility gap. The concept of meaningful human control is inadequate for the complex and chaotic environment of warfare, particularly when introducing powerful weapons that push the boundaries of human capability. While role-responsibility considers the collective nature of the military and the entire chain of command, it faces challenges in accounting for the problem of many hands and the emergent behavior of autonomous weapons that cannot be directly attributed to a specific part of the system or individual. Especially in a value-loaded and ethically charged environment such as war, where choices regarding life or death are a routine matter, there is no room for obscured responsibility. Without proper responsibility, one cannot justify the introduction of LAWs onto the battlefield.Show less
In this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR...Show moreIn this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR should instead be thought of as a different type of quality. On my account, moral responsibility is an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to agents. I establish firstly four desiderata used to evaluate the adequacy of any theory of moral responsibility. Using these, I argue that neither libertarian nor compatibilist theories of free will provide a sure bulwark of moral responsibility as a property. This, combined with the rationale involving the problematic nature of this property, leads me to a conclusion similar to that of the hard determinist: the property of moral responsibility cannot exist. However, in order to avoid responsibility nihilism that follows from this moral responsibility scepticism, I propose that MR may exist as an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to human and non-human agents by following fair rules. Finally, I opt to explain why such account of attributive moral responsibility (AMR) provides a more adequate response to the desiderata than rival accounts.Show less
