Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with...Show moreBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with Russia or China. There is another analogy: playing in the major league is awarding. Land-based and seabased missile defense each are attractive options, offering pros and cons to foreign policy makers, while military planners have to make tough decisions on how to allocate scarce defense resources in the face of austerity. A small or medium-sized state like the Netherlands has only a few policy options: emulate the policy of the hegemon, strive for national or European innovative solutions or (continue to) do nothing at all. Neoclassical realism holds that the state is not a black box in the anarchy of international relations, but that the foreign policy elite makes resource allocation decisions on the basis of its own perception of the external vulnerability of the state. State institutions, domestic influence groups and party politics in turn influence both threat perception and resource allocation. Resource allocation should ideally support the best foreign policy option to counter the perceived threat. Of course, external state actors, industrial and transnational organizations influence the foreign policy elite as well. Against this backdrop, the author uses the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism to research and describe the influence that domestic influence groups can exert on policy decisions regarding the Netherlands’ BMD capabilities. After a brief introduction into neoclassical realism, the external vulnerability is described in terms of the existing ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. The threat perception is approached form the eye of the beholder: regional actors, NATO as our primary security alliance and of course domestic actors. Then the primary BMD resources available to the Netherlands are described: operational capabilities, technological innovation and defense industrial base. External factors and domestic interest groups that affect resource allocation decisions, such as the international defense industry and national civic societal actors, are analyzed. The dominant foreign policy mantra that the Netherlands’ international reputation is at stake after incessant defense budget cuts and relinquishing our NATO commitments is also taken into account as a factor of influence. Finally, four adaptive strategies are researched as BMD policy options: blindly emulate US policy (with high investment costs), join European innovation policies (with high political and investment costs), do nothing (which eventually leads to a free rider status) or a mixed innovative emulation strategy (which attains foreign policy objectives appropriate for a small or medium power while at the same time promoting Dutch industrial interests). Research indicates that very few domestic actors actually oppose the Dutch role in BMD. The author concludes that the Netherlands cannot afford to lose its leading position in European BMD capabilities. Our reputation is firmly based on our Patriot capability, and for a long time we have punched above our weight. Our credibility is at risk – and maritime BMD is one of the very few niche capabilities that we hold as bargaining chip to promote our interests in international relations. The stakes are high – but so are the potential rewards.Show less
