In recent years, especially since Alexander Wendt’s 2015 'Quantum mind and social science,' a timid yet promising body of literature, building from a range of post-structuralist and new materialist...Show moreIn recent years, especially since Alexander Wendt’s 2015 'Quantum mind and social science,' a timid yet promising body of literature, building from a range of post-structuralist and new materialist theory, has sought out to disentangle the ubiquity of the “Newtonian imagery” (Murphy, 2019) and its effects in social theorizing in IR. However, sustained attention to 'Quantum Mind' has led many to associate this bourgeoning field with Wendt’s own philosophical claims, despite a great number of rich and varied contributions. Despite Wendt’s attempts to the contrary, his adoption of “quantum realism” (Murphy, 2021) poses substantial risks to the kind of anti-positivism quantum social science claims to spearhead. In this thesis, I explore the reasons why Wendt’s take on human subjectivity entails a transcendentalist position unwarranted by his attempt at a ‘flat’ ontology. As I argue, his reliance on analytical philosophy of mind leads him to effectively adopt a physicalist position which he now rebrands as naturalism. This inherent contradiction allows to trace Wendt’s metaphysical allegiances to the unsuspected legacy of logical empiricism in their insistence on the language of physicalism and the Unity of Science thesis.Show less
In deze scriptie beargumenteer ik dat aan de hand van de Ability Hypothesis een overtuigende fysicalistische beschrijving van qualia gegeven kan worden.
