The current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the...Show moreThe current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the uncertainty of public demand and the social value orientation of an individual on these cooperative decisions. The public demand in the current study simulates the threat of a potential collective disaster. In this study, a Public Goods Game and two variants of this game are used, the certain and uncertain Public Account Games. It was expected that there would be more cooperation in a situation with public demand and certain public demand, compared to no and uncertain public demand. Contrary to the expectations, the results indicated that adding public demand, both certain and uncertain, to the games does not affect cooperative decisions much. Also, in the certain public demand condition, tacit coordination through fairness rules was expected. However, the results show that there is no link between public demand as a focal point and the use of fairness rules. This finding implies that in situations with a public demand, the social value orientation of an individual is not relied upon, nor are cooperative decisions coordinated by applying fairness rules. In situations without public demand, the social value orientation of an individual turns out to be leading. The discussion outlines the implications for these findings and provides suggestions for future research.Show less
Most collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal...Show moreMost collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal needs or the collective needs. In this study it will be investigated if the public demand can drive people to coordinate their cooperation decisions and how this will be influenced by the environment uncertainty and social value orientation. This will be tested in one experiment with three different conditions: a public goods game without a public demand, a public account game with a certain public demand and a public account game with an uncertain public demand. In those three conditions the participants have to decide how much they will contribute to the collective account. Although we expected the public demand to be a coordination point for cooperation decisions, where people would use a rule of equity, this is not in line with what was found in the results. In situations with a public demand people do not act in line with their social value orientation, but which principle participants did use to coordinate the cooperation decisions hasn’t been found in this study. Environmental uncertainty also seems to be irrelevant in the process of making cooperation decisions, which was against our expectations as well. The social value orientation does seem to have an influence. Pro-socials cooperate more than pro-selfs do, especially in situations with a certain public demand. In situations with an uncertain public demand the gap in cooperation between pro-socials and pro-selfs narrowed.Show less
