People are exposed to a wide range of aversive conditions, including climate change and pandemics, which can have a profound impact on individual wellbeing and communal functioning. While there is...Show morePeople are exposed to a wide range of aversive conditions, including climate change and pandemics, which can have a profound impact on individual wellbeing and communal functioning. While there is evidence suggesting that exposure to threat and the prospect of punishment promote cooperation, the necessity of punishment in cooperation’s maintenance under threat is largely unexplored. In the current study, we examined whether the presence of threat requires less punishment to maintain cooperation. In a laboratory experiment individuals in groups of three (N=60) were exposed (or not) to the threat of electric shocks while deciding how much to contribute to the common pool. Additionally, half of the tested groups (N=30) were subjected to a peer-punishment procedure in which individuals had the option to deduct money (MU’s) from other group members’ accounts. Heart rate and skin conductance were continuously measured while participants were exposed to the aforementioned procedure. In comparison to the nothreat condition, the threat of shock resulted in a neurophysiological freezing response characterized by a reduction in heart rate and an increase in skin conductance. We find that in contrast to our expectations, threat by itself does not promote cooperation and punishment is needed in cooperation’s maintenance. Overall, our results suggest that the presence of threat does not diminish the role of punishment in increasing cooperation. Our results have implications for policy interventions designed to sustain cooperation under threat.Show less
Most collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal...Show moreMost collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal needs or the collective needs. In this study it will be investigated if the public demand can drive people to coordinate their cooperation decisions and how this will be influenced by the environment uncertainty and social value orientation. This will be tested in one experiment with three different conditions: a public goods game without a public demand, a public account game with a certain public demand and a public account game with an uncertain public demand. In those three conditions the participants have to decide how much they will contribute to the collective account. Although we expected the public demand to be a coordination point for cooperation decisions, where people would use a rule of equity, this is not in line with what was found in the results. In situations with a public demand people do not act in line with their social value orientation, but which principle participants did use to coordinate the cooperation decisions hasn’t been found in this study. Environmental uncertainty also seems to be irrelevant in the process of making cooperation decisions, which was against our expectations as well. The social value orientation does seem to have an influence. Pro-socials cooperate more than pro-selfs do, especially in situations with a certain public demand. In situations with an uncertain public demand the gap in cooperation between pro-socials and pro-selfs narrowed.Show less
