In this study, we study the effect of productivity uncertainty on the contribution to public goods. We hypothesize that uncertainty about the productivity of the public god leads to a decrease in...Show moreIn this study, we study the effect of productivity uncertainty on the contribution to public goods. We hypothesize that uncertainty about the productivity of the public god leads to a decrease in the perceived impact of the contribution resulting in a lower contribution to the public good. We also hypothesize that this effect on the perceived impact is moderated by a general sense of powerlessness. We have performed an online experiment in which participants faced both a public good game with and without productivity uncertainty. Results showed that uncertainty decreased the contribution to the public good, but this effect was not explained by perceived impact nor a general sense of powerlessness. Interpretations and limitations of this research and suggestions for future research are discussed.Show less
The prevalent theory of burden-sharing in NATO today did not accurately predict contributions in ISAF. Through an analysis of parliamentary debates in the United Kingdom and Germany, this paper...Show moreThe prevalent theory of burden-sharing in NATO today did not accurately predict contributions in ISAF. Through an analysis of parliamentary debates in the United Kingdom and Germany, this paper argues that domestic factors are important predictors in contributions to alliances. Domestic and international concerns interact in a two-level dynamic, where a valuation of alliance membership and support by domestic elites play a central role.Show less
Collective action problems such as climate change, overfishing and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic can be tackled with large-scale cooperation. However, cooperation often deteriorates due to...Show moreCollective action problems such as climate change, overfishing and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic can be tackled with large-scale cooperation. However, cooperation often deteriorates due to conflicts between collective and individual interests, even though collective action would result in more favorable outcomes for everyone. To protect oneself against the risks of cooperation failure, individual solutions to shared problems have been introduced, such as privatized healthcare and education. Unfortunately, these private alternatives to public goods may crowd out cooperation, leading to under-provision of public goods that benefit all members of society. The current study aimed to examine the role of leadership-by-example as a mechanism to facilitate group cooperation in a self-reliance dilemma, whereby participants confronted shared problems that could be solved either collectively or individually. Leadership was introduced by allowing one group member to set an example by choosing the cooperative or individual decision first. Both randomly assigned and endogenously self-selected leaders were investigated. We found that group members consistently preferred individual solutions when they were affordable, irrespective of leadership. However, no significant effects were found regarding the effect of leadership. While it is likely that a lack of statistical power led to these insignificant findings, it could be speculated that a lack of trust, risk aversion and lack of reciprocity may have played a role. These topics constitute interesting avenues for future research and would provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of leadership in coordinating collective action.Show less
