The greatest threats to authoritarian tenure is not rebellion or popular uprising, but the possibility of a coup or attack from within the government. An authoritarian leader shares its power with...Show moreThe greatest threats to authoritarian tenure is not rebellion or popular uprising, but the possibility of a coup or attack from within the government. An authoritarian leader shares its power with the ruling coalition, as their power and influence is necessary for the survival of the regime. However, authoritarian leaders have a desire for more power and need to accomplish this to guarantee both his own survival and the survival of the regime, but this is usually at the expense of the leader’s rivals. Authoritarian leaders use several measures to consolidate their power against the potential threats of the ruling coalition, such as interstate war and mass killings. The aim of this paper is to gain knowledge about what circumstances cause authoritarian leaders to choose interstate war or mass killings as consolidation-measure against threats of the ruling coalition? With the three within-case studies of Pol Pot (Cambodia), Mao Zedong (China) and Fidel Castro (Cuba) I argue two things. Firstly, although revolutionary regimes have indeed strong military representation in the state apparatus, they are not as resistant to rivalry as argued in literature. Secondly, I argue that the location of the rivals in the state apparatus is not as important as argued by certain scholars, since authoritarian leaders use both mass killings and interstate war when there is strong representation of military in the ruling coalition.Show less
Why do armed non-state groups initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war? In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace...Show moreWhy do armed non-state groups initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war? In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace agreements with power-sharing arrangements have long been argued to be the best civil war resolution, as a result, these have become a default tool in civil war resolution. However, in more than half of these cases, civil war did recur. Empirical research shows that power-sharing is indeed successful in stabilizing peace among former adversaries. The answer to why civil wars terminated by negotiated settlements with power-sharing start again is likely to be found within the groups included in the settlement. The problem is not so much the resolution of hostilities between (former) foes, but rather the rise of hostilities among former allies. This thesis argues that power-sharing might (temporarily) establish a balance of power between former adversaries, at the same time it negatively affects the balance of power within the groups, causing intra-group security dilemmas and rivalry leading to remobilization and initiation of conflict. This theoretical proposal is tested in a qualitative study of post-civil war Sudan and Tajikistan, by questioning how power-sharing affected the internal dynamics of the rebel groups. What made rebel groups initiate conflict again, or, why did they not?Show less
