This thesis analysed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness. First, it outlines why the OSCE can be defined as a security network and...Show moreThis thesis analysed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness. First, it outlines why the OSCE can be defined as a security network and provides a literature review on both topics. The theoretical framework concludes that the OSCE is analysed in terms of its legitimacy using the criteria of transparency, independent monitoring, public involvement and consensus. Structural, cultural, political, technological and relational dimensions were identified as criteria for effectiveness. The analysis revealed two main challenges. The first challenge is the consequences of a system based on consent. The second challenge is building and maintaining trust among the 57 participating states. Due to its size, a lack of trust makes it difficult to reach consesnus on matters discussed and can have severe consequences. The scope of this work is limited and further research is needed on these issues.Show less
This research aims to identify the challenges to the effectiveness of a Cyber Security Raad (CSR) to understand the applicability of the concept “security networks” in real-life. Security networks...Show moreThis research aims to identify the challenges to the effectiveness of a Cyber Security Raad (CSR) to understand the applicability of the concept “security networks” in real-life. Security networks are collaborations between interdependent structures with a shared goal. This type of organizational structure is recent and under-researched making it extremely important to test this theoretical foundation. Therefore, a case study of CSR is chosen to explore the effectiveness of the security network. Next to that, a document analysis provided an overview of the council, its tasks, and its outcomes. This thesis demonstrates that there are three challenges to the effectiveness of CSR as a security network. First, a CSR does not provide an overview of the financial and bureaucratic proceedings raising the question of accountability. Second, the council lacks research planning leading to the absence of activity overview and tasks allocation. Third, a CSR does not clearly explain cooperation with other actors and what these actors do. This study is significant as it informs about the possibility of applying “security networks” to a case. It also provides valuable feedback on research design for academia and recommendations for CSR, respectively.Show less
Master thesis | Crisis and Security Management (MSc)
open access
De AIVD en MIVD nemen uit hoofde van hun taak in het belang van de nationale veiligheid regelmatig strafbaar gedrag waar, maar maken daarvan niet altijd melding bij de opsporingsautoriteiten. Ze...Show moreDe AIVD en MIVD nemen uit hoofde van hun taak in het belang van de nationale veiligheid regelmatig strafbaar gedrag waar, maar maken daarvan niet altijd melding bij de opsporingsautoriteiten. Ze zijn weliswaar verplicht om hun bronnen, methoden en kennisniveau af te schermen, maar dat verklaart niet waarom zij hun discretionaire bevoegdheid om het te melden, in de woorden van een AIVD-hoofd, ‘soms wel en soms niet’ gebruiken. Met deze studie is geprobeerd om in kaart te brengen wat zo’n inlichtingen- en/of veiligheidsdienst (verder: dienst) tot verstrekking van inlichtingen aan justitie drijft, en wat hem daarvan weerhoudt. Derhalve is de hypothese - dat diensten slechts verstrekken met het oogmerk om de aan hen gestelde taak en behoeftes te bevorderen - getoetst, en is geprobeerd andere drijfveren af te leiden. Hiertoe zijn getuigenverklaringen van oud-diensthoofden en ruim 500 ambtsberichten geanalyseerd, en zijn vraaggesprekken met betrokken ambtenaren gevoerd. Ter contextualisering is aan de hand van haar wetsgeschiedenis de institutionele verhouding tussen inlichtingen en opsporing in Nederland geschetst. Uit het onderzoek volgt dat de AIVD noch de MIVD een eenduidig verstrekkingsbeleid heeft of beleeft, en dat de hypothese te rigide is: Hoewel er ter bevordering van de nationale veiligheid verstrekt wordt, kan ook of slechts zijn beoogd om een ander belang te dienen. Zo kan zij door politieke of technocratische prikkels gedreven worden. De afdelingsculturen en het geweten van individuele medewerkers bepalen of verstrekking van inlichtingen wegens niets dan hun strafvorderlijke relevantie überhaupt overwogen wordt. Ingeval deze conclusie als problematisch zou worden gezien, wat omwille van het voorzienbaarheidsbeginsel voorstelbaar is, wordt aangeraden om niet tot verstrekking te verplichten, maar hooguit voor te schrijven in welke gevallen verstrekking overwogen dient te worden. / The Netherlands’ intelligence and security services AIVD and MIVD regularly witness, by virtue of their task in the interest of national security, crimes; crimes they do not always report to the criminal justice authorities. Although they are obliged to shield their sources, methods and knowledge level, this does not explain why they, in the words of a former AIVD-chief, ‘sometimes do and sometimes do not’ use their discretionary competence to report. This study tried to map by which variables an intelligence and/or security service (further: service) is driven towards reporting such intelligence, and which restrain him from it. Therefore, the hypothesis - that services disseminate only for the purpose of advancing their set task and requirements - was tested and was tried to deduce other drivers. Hereto, witness testimonies of former intelligence chiefs and some 500 intelligence products were analysed. Moreover, involved civil servants were interviewed. For contextualisation, the institutional relation between intelligence and law enforcement in the Netherlands was drawn by assessing its parliamentary history. This research shows that neither the AIVD nor the MIVD maintains a clear dissemination policy, and that the hypothesis is too rigid: Although intelligence is indeed disseminated for the purpose of fostering national security, it is done also or sorely for the sake of other interests. Thus, dissemination could be driven by political or technocratic incentives. The organisational cultures and the conscience of individual officers determine whether reporting of intelligence for no reason but its prosecutorial relevance is considered at all. In case this conclusion is viewed as problematic, which is understandable in light of the principle of foreseeability, it is recommended to - at most - prescribe the conditions in which reporting should be considered, instead of obliging dissemination.Show less
