This paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human...Show moreThis paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human behaviour for over two millennia. Most literature treats akrasia as an isolated instance of a weak will. However, unlike most approaches, this thesis aims to reconceptualise akrasia as a character trait based on the tripartite relationship between its recurrence, self-deception, and self-control. The proposed view sees recurrent akratic behaviour as an essential factor in that process, which is often overlooked. Agents repeatedly fail to adhere to their better judgement, which supports the hypothesis of reconceptualising akrasia as a trait since it isn’t a one-time event but part of a person’s character. In this process of rethinking akrasia as a trait, self-deception is conscripted against the agent’s better judgment. This creates a bidirectional relationship between akrasia and self-deception, allowing the agents to deceive themselves and further reinforce both. Over time, as the juncture between akrasia and self- deception becomes stronger, it undermines the agent’s self-control. As the two manifest, the agent’s ability to develop and maintain self-control is hindered, reinforcing akratic behaviour.Show less
When it is presented as a strictly epistemological problem, both Kant and Nietzsche are critical of the possibility of self-knowledge. Kant, in his Anthropology, issues a warning for self...Show moreWhen it is presented as a strictly epistemological problem, both Kant and Nietzsche are critical of the possibility of self-knowledge. Kant, in his Anthropology, issues a warning for self-observation of unintentional or involuntary perceptions of our thoughts and feelings, because this leads to ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘madness’. This is because of different forms of self-deception and the fact that Kant holds that self-observation should be observation of voluntary mental representations. With this warning, I argue, the risk of self-observation becomes a problem of moral psychology. Nietzsche also offers a warning or atleast a stipulation of the fact that ‘digging into one’s self’ might lead to hurting ourselves. Instead, Nietzsche argues for self-observation through ‘the outside path’ of the world, which we can then relate back to ourselves. This enables us to be self-creating individuals. In this self-creation however there is still a risk of isolation, but Nietzsche takes this for granted. I compare both thinkers and what I have laid out about their views on the risk of self-observation. I argue that both thinkers recognize risks involved in self-observation, but for different reasons. I also offer a Nietzschean argument against the warning of Kant. Nietzsche would and does argue that not everything we think is voluntary and that philosophy in general is related to the morality we aim at. This also goes for Kant and the warning he issues in the Anthropology, which Nietzsche would argue springs from Kant’s universal morality.Show less
