This study investigated the interaction between social class and perceived economic mobility on prosocial behavior. Previous research has provided mixed evidence on whether social standing affects...Show moreThis study investigated the interaction between social class and perceived economic mobility on prosocial behavior. Previous research has provided mixed evidence on whether social standing affects prosociality. Furthermore, a knowledge gap exists in understanding how beliefs about personal economic mobility may moderate this relationship. This study aimed to establish whether social class increases prosocial behavior and if perceived economic mobility influences the relationship between social class and prosociality. The experimental design assessed prosociality through a giving game with 362 participants randomly assigned to different ranks (i.e., a proxy for social class) and mobility conditions. Results showed that higher-ranked individuals were more prosocial than those from lower ranks. Additionally, individuals perceiving high economic mobility were more prosocial than those perceiving low mobility. Nevertheless, the relationship between social class and prosociality remained stable regardless of mobility levels. These findings highlight potential socioeconomic determinants of prosocial behavior, encouraging interventions fostering fair and equitable societies.Show less
Research has found significant effects of social class on prosocial behavior, but diverging findings for the influence of political ideology. In this study, the aim was to find out whether ideology...Show moreResearch has found significant effects of social class on prosocial behavior, but diverging findings for the influence of political ideology. In this study, the aim was to find out whether ideology influences prosociality towards people of a low or a high social class. This was investigated by conducting an online experiment with liberals and conservatives (N = 294), where they engaged in the social mindfulness (SoMi) task, which served as a measure for prosocial behavior. For the SoMi task, the participants were told to imagine they had an interaction partner who was either of a low social class or high social class. My hypotheses for this research were that liberals would treat targets of a low social class more prosocially than conservatives (H1), that conservatives would treat targets of a high social class more prosocially than liberals (H2) and that the tendencies towards low-class targets would be mediated by perceptions of deservingness and compassion towards them (H3). Although these hypotheses could not be confirmed, there was a significant effect of target class on social mindfulness, indicating that lower-class targets elicited more prosocial behavior than higher-class targets, in line with previous research. In addition to that, political ideology had a significant effect on social mindfulness when controlling for age, which showed that those identifying as very liberal acted more prosocially than those identifying as conservative.Show less
The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and due to its longevity, strict sectarian lines have formed. The sectarian narrative does not do justice in explaining the origins of the Syrian...Show moreThe Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and due to its longevity, strict sectarian lines have formed. The sectarian narrative does not do justice in explaining the origins of the Syrian conflict, which started with peaceful protests in 2011. Such a narrative is based on a static and primordial view of Syria. As a response to that narrative this thesis uses social class theory to examine the years in Syria’s political economy in the years preceding the 2011 uprising. The five years before the uprising are important from an economic, social and political perspective as Syria initiated a transition to a social market economy. The two research question are as follows: How did Syria’s economic liberalisation from 2006 to 2010 change socioeconomic conditions vis-à-vis Syria’s civil uprising in 2011? And what role does social class play in Syria's socioeconomic grievances? The research questions are answered through case studies of the agricultural sector, investments in Syria, and the economic transition’s connection to the 2011 uprising. The case studies’ results are that socioeconomic conditions of lower and middle classes stagnated or worsened in the years before the uprising, displayed in unemployment and a widening wealth gap. Investments patterns in Syria in the economic liberalisation show how profits went those in the upper and ruling classes with ties to the regime. By that, it is concluded that class played a large role in Syria’s socioeconomic grievances that played a partial role in creating circumstances for the 2011 uprising. The explanation is, nonetheless, not sufficient on its own to explain the 2011 uprising. Future research on Syria’s political economy should continue to focus on classes and other social communities in order to provide better explanations for societal changes.Show less
