Resource scarcity and diminishing biodiversity are pressing global issues underscored by phenomena such as Earth Overshoot Day. Understanding human behavior in resource dilemma tasks offers...Show moreResource scarcity and diminishing biodiversity are pressing global issues underscored by phenomena such as Earth Overshoot Day. Understanding human behavior in resource dilemma tasks offers insights into mitigating resource overconsumption. This study tried to identify the impact of average group dominance on group performance in resource dilemmas. Drawing on observed behavior like the tragedy of the commons by Van Lange and colleagues (2013) and theories on social heuristics, we hypothesized that higher group dominance scores would correlate with less cooperative behavior and lower proportion of optimal group resource harvest (POGH). We conducted a computerized resource dilemma task with 63 participants, divided into groups of three, after having assessed their individual dominance score using a modified Dominance-Prestige Scale developed by Cheng et al.. Results indicated a very weak, non-significant negative correlation between group dominance scores and the POGH. Limitations in the methodology of the study are believed to have been the main reason the results were not significant. Further research into the social mechanisms behind the tragedy of the commons is recommended.Show less
The present study investigates how the exertion of effort will impact behavior in an anticommons resource dilemma. Anticommons dilemmas arise when limitations in access lead to underuse. A paradigm...Show moreThe present study investigates how the exertion of effort will impact behavior in an anticommons resource dilemma. Anticommons dilemmas arise when limitations in access lead to underuse. A paradigm was developed in which two participants shared a common resource of 100 points. Using the resource was only possible if both parties reached an agreement. In the experiment, participants were asked to indicate how many points they would like to receive (WTA values) to grant the other party access to the resource. Likewise, they were asked how many points they would like to spend (WTP values) to get access themselves. Before the indication of WTA and WTP, half of the participants needed to complete a slider task to simulate an effortful task to gain co-ownership of the resource. 237 UK participants were recruited and put in dyads to partake in the online experiment. Results revealed that social value orientation (SVO) strongly impacted the behavior and outcome of anticommons dilemmas. SVO was negatively correlated to WTA values, which suggests that a higher score on SVO (indicating higher prosociality) led to higher willingness to grant the other party access to the resource. Moreover, a positive effect of psychological ownership on WTP values was found. Lastly, it was found that effort did have a significant effect on WTA values in anticommons dilemmas. Participants who were exposed to an effortful task prior to the bargaining game were setting higher WTA values than those who were not.Show less
This experimental study examines the effects of social value orientation and accountability on the choices made in a volunteer’s dilemma. This is a dilemma in which at least one person must...Show moreThis experimental study examines the effects of social value orientation and accountability on the choices made in a volunteer’s dilemma. This is a dilemma in which at least one person must sacrifice their time and effort for everyone to have the benefits. In the experiment I used 156 participants (N = 156). 88 of them were men. The participants in this study were divided in groups of three before being presented with the volunteer’s dilemma. A logistic regression analysis showed that being prosocial did not have a significant influence on participants’ choice to volunteer and that being held accountable for this choice did not either. This outcome is different from what would be expected based on existing literature. At the end of this thesis, theoretical and practical implications are discussed and suggestions for follow-up research are considered.Show less
Collective action problems such as climate change, overfishing and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic can be tackled with large-scale cooperation. However, cooperation often deteriorates due to...Show moreCollective action problems such as climate change, overfishing and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic can be tackled with large-scale cooperation. However, cooperation often deteriorates due to conflicts between collective and individual interests, even though collective action would result in more favorable outcomes for everyone. To protect oneself against the risks of cooperation failure, individual solutions to shared problems have been introduced, such as privatized healthcare and education. Unfortunately, these private alternatives to public goods may crowd out cooperation, leading to under-provision of public goods that benefit all members of society. The current study aimed to examine the role of leadership-by-example as a mechanism to facilitate group cooperation in a self-reliance dilemma, whereby participants confronted shared problems that could be solved either collectively or individually. Leadership was introduced by allowing one group member to set an example by choosing the cooperative or individual decision first. Both randomly assigned and endogenously self-selected leaders were investigated. We found that group members consistently preferred individual solutions when they were affordable, irrespective of leadership. However, no significant effects were found regarding the effect of leadership. While it is likely that a lack of statistical power led to these insignificant findings, it could be speculated that a lack of trust, risk aversion and lack of reciprocity may have played a role. These topics constitute interesting avenues for future research and would provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of leadership in coordinating collective action.Show less
Een collectieve ramp kan bestempeld worden als een sociaal dilemma. Sociale dilemma’s hebben als kenmerk dat het individuele belang in conflict raakt met het collectief belang. Dit artikel...Show moreEen collectieve ramp kan bestempeld worden als een sociaal dilemma. Sociale dilemma’s hebben als kenmerk dat het individuele belang in conflict raakt met het collectief belang. Dit artikel introduceert de term Publieke Vraag. Deze term geeft de vraag naar persoonlijke offers om een graduele overgang van negatieve naar positieve gevolgen te behalen weer. De publieke vraag en omgevingsonzekerheid die aanwezig zijn bij collectieve rampen worden onderzocht aan de hand van de eveneens in dit onderzoek geïntroduceerde public account games. Hierin worden de coöperatie beslissingen geanalyseerd die mogelijk gemaakt worden tijdens een collectieve ramp. Daarnaast kijkt dit artikel naar de verwachting van andermans bijdrage en het gebruik van focal points voor coördinatie. De publieke vraag en onzekerheid lijken geen impact te hebben op de coöperatiebeslissingen en verwachting van andermans bijdrage. Dit suggereert dat de publieke vraag niet als focal point wordt gebruikt om te coördineren tijdens een collectieve ramp zoals voorafgaand werd verwacht. Theoretische en methodologische implicaties worden besproken.Show less
The current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the...Show moreThe current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the uncertainty of public demand and the social value orientation of an individual on these cooperative decisions. The public demand in the current study simulates the threat of a potential collective disaster. In this study, a Public Goods Game and two variants of this game are used, the certain and uncertain Public Account Games. It was expected that there would be more cooperation in a situation with public demand and certain public demand, compared to no and uncertain public demand. Contrary to the expectations, the results indicated that adding public demand, both certain and uncertain, to the games does not affect cooperative decisions much. Also, in the certain public demand condition, tacit coordination through fairness rules was expected. However, the results show that there is no link between public demand as a focal point and the use of fairness rules. This finding implies that in situations with a public demand, the social value orientation of an individual is not relied upon, nor are cooperative decisions coordinated by applying fairness rules. In situations without public demand, the social value orientation of an individual turns out to be leading. The discussion outlines the implications for these findings and provides suggestions for future research.Show less
