The present study investigates how the exertion of effort will impact behavior in an anticommons resource dilemma. Anticommons dilemmas arise when limitations in access lead to underuse. A paradigm...Show moreThe present study investigates how the exertion of effort will impact behavior in an anticommons resource dilemma. Anticommons dilemmas arise when limitations in access lead to underuse. A paradigm was developed in which two participants shared a common resource of 100 points. Using the resource was only possible if both parties reached an agreement. In the experiment, participants were asked to indicate how many points they would like to receive (WTA values) to grant the other party access to the resource. Likewise, they were asked how many points they would like to spend (WTP values) to get access themselves. Before the indication of WTA and WTP, half of the participants needed to complete a slider task to simulate an effortful task to gain co-ownership of the resource. 237 UK participants were recruited and put in dyads to partake in the online experiment. Results revealed that social value orientation (SVO) strongly impacted the behavior and outcome of anticommons dilemmas. SVO was negatively correlated to WTA values, which suggests that a higher score on SVO (indicating higher prosociality) led to higher willingness to grant the other party access to the resource. Moreover, a positive effect of psychological ownership on WTP values was found. Lastly, it was found that effort did have a significant effect on WTA values in anticommons dilemmas. Participants who were exposed to an effortful task prior to the bargaining game were setting higher WTA values than those who were not.Show less
This experimental study examines the effects of social value orientation and accountability on the choices made in a volunteer’s dilemma. This is a dilemma in which at least one person must...Show moreThis experimental study examines the effects of social value orientation and accountability on the choices made in a volunteer’s dilemma. This is a dilemma in which at least one person must sacrifice their time and effort for everyone to have the benefits. In the experiment I used 156 participants (N = 156). 88 of them were men. The participants in this study were divided in groups of three before being presented with the volunteer’s dilemma. A logistic regression analysis showed that being prosocial did not have a significant influence on participants’ choice to volunteer and that being held accountable for this choice did not either. This outcome is different from what would be expected based on existing literature. At the end of this thesis, theoretical and practical implications are discussed and suggestions for follow-up research are considered.Show less
The present study explores the effect of externalities awareness and Social Value Orientation (SVO) in anticommons dilemmas. Making participants of an anticommons game aware of externalities was...Show moreThe present study explores the effect of externalities awareness and Social Value Orientation (SVO) in anticommons dilemmas. Making participants of an anticommons game aware of externalities was expected to increase cooperation, by decreasing their willingnessto-accept (WTA) values, i.e. the amount they would be willing to accept in order to allow other individuals to make use of the resource. The results of the computer-based anticommons game (N = 167) did not support this hypothesis. However, the results did show, as predicted, that the more prosocial participants were, the more easily they allowed access to the resource by setting lower willingness-to-accept (WTA) values. Additionally, the hypothesized interaction effect between externalities awareness and Social Value Orientation (SVO) was not confirmed. Proselfs’ behavior did not change significantly more than prosocials’, after they got aware of the externalities. Finally, the negative effects of uncertainty in cooperation are discussed.Show less
The current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the...Show moreThe current study examines whether a public demand (for personal sacrifices) can serve as a focal point for coordinating cooperative decisions. The study also examines the influence of the uncertainty of public demand and the social value orientation of an individual on these cooperative decisions. The public demand in the current study simulates the threat of a potential collective disaster. In this study, a Public Goods Game and two variants of this game are used, the certain and uncertain Public Account Games. It was expected that there would be more cooperation in a situation with public demand and certain public demand, compared to no and uncertain public demand. Contrary to the expectations, the results indicated that adding public demand, both certain and uncertain, to the games does not affect cooperative decisions much. Also, in the certain public demand condition, tacit coordination through fairness rules was expected. However, the results show that there is no link between public demand as a focal point and the use of fairness rules. This finding implies that in situations with a public demand, the social value orientation of an individual is not relied upon, nor are cooperative decisions coordinated by applying fairness rules. In situations without public demand, the social value orientation of an individual turns out to be leading. The discussion outlines the implications for these findings and provides suggestions for future research.Show less
Most collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal...Show moreMost collaborative situations are characterized by a ‘public demand’ of personal sacrifices to serve the collective needs, where there is often a choice to be made to either serve your personal needs or the collective needs. In this study it will be investigated if the public demand can drive people to coordinate their cooperation decisions and how this will be influenced by the environment uncertainty and social value orientation. This will be tested in one experiment with three different conditions: a public goods game without a public demand, a public account game with a certain public demand and a public account game with an uncertain public demand. In those three conditions the participants have to decide how much they will contribute to the collective account. Although we expected the public demand to be a coordination point for cooperation decisions, where people would use a rule of equity, this is not in line with what was found in the results. In situations with a public demand people do not act in line with their social value orientation, but which principle participants did use to coordinate the cooperation decisions hasn’t been found in this study. Environmental uncertainty also seems to be irrelevant in the process of making cooperation decisions, which was against our expectations as well. The social value orientation does seem to have an influence. Pro-socials cooperate more than pro-selfs do, especially in situations with a certain public demand. In situations with an uncertain public demand the gap in cooperation between pro-socials and pro-selfs narrowed.Show less
