Russian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades,...Show moreRussian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades, been accepted as a strategic concept into the doctrinal documents of key Western military actors, including NATO and the EU. This paper argues that analysts misinterpret Russia’s operational, context-dependent opportunism in Ukraine as a holistic strategic method. So, in order to examine the extent to which Russian actions in Ukraine are actually strategic and whether the contemporary hybrid warfare concept improves or stifles that understanding, this paper examines the following: to what extent is Russian so-called hybrid warfare in Ukraine strategic? Three key events in the Russo-Ukrainian War are analysed using classical theory on strategy as a guiding framework, making use of a thematic case study analysis. It is shown that Russian actions in Ukraine are classically strategic to a highly limited extent because (1) battle is not always central and (2) Russian political coordination is either absent or opportunistic. Russian actions in Ukraine thus do not indicate a holistically integrated strategic method – which Western observers have eagerly dubbed hybrid warfare. Rather, the reality shows a method of operational opportunism enabled by a permissive political and battlespace-context. Hybrid warfare therefore does not merit adoption as a strategic concept, because it is not strategic. Using hybrid warfare as a strategic concept thus dilutes what we perceive to be strategic – and what we perceive to be warfare – proving the importance of testing new concepts against classical wisdom.Show less
