One year into the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, debates still rage over the Russian motivations for this war. Purely international explanations, found in offensive and defensive realism, emphasise that...Show moreOne year into the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, debates still rage over the Russian motivations for this war. Purely international explanations, found in offensive and defensive realism, emphasise that wars are best understood as a means of states to ensure security among states. I argue that domestic considerations matter by stressing the analytical utility of the selectorate theory of war, which argues that state behaviour is best explained by a leader's desire to stay in power through ensuring loyalty by providing public and private goods. Using a qualitative explanatory case study research design, focusing on a single case: the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is found that before the war, Vladimir Putin was facing a crisis of political survival because his ability to ensure support from the elites he depended on and the wider public was increasingly constrained during his presidency due to a persistently stagnating economy. The war strengthened Putin’s political survival because newly acquired territories provide new sources of revenue for Russia’s elites. For the wider public, this study strongly suggests that Putin was aiming for a rally round the flag effect to distract the public at home from deteriorating circumstances and temporarily reduce the demand for public goods. In addition, the war legitimised greater repression, which signals a high cost of expressing discontent with Putin which deters future opposition and serves as a means to purge the elites and the broader public from disloyalty. Understanding these domestic factors that are negated by the purely international explanations of war is crucial for understanding the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war. This thesis provides a novel contribution to the literature explaining Russia’s foreign policies by using the selectorate theory of war, a theory that has not been used systematically for explaining Russia’s foreign policy.Show less
Russian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades,...Show moreRussian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades, been accepted as a strategic concept into the doctrinal documents of key Western military actors, including NATO and the EU. This paper argues that analysts misinterpret Russia’s operational, context-dependent opportunism in Ukraine as a holistic strategic method. So, in order to examine the extent to which Russian actions in Ukraine are actually strategic and whether the contemporary hybrid warfare concept improves or stifles that understanding, this paper examines the following: to what extent is Russian so-called hybrid warfare in Ukraine strategic? Three key events in the Russo-Ukrainian War are analysed using classical theory on strategy as a guiding framework, making use of a thematic case study analysis. It is shown that Russian actions in Ukraine are classically strategic to a highly limited extent because (1) battle is not always central and (2) Russian political coordination is either absent or opportunistic. Russian actions in Ukraine thus do not indicate a holistically integrated strategic method – which Western observers have eagerly dubbed hybrid warfare. Rather, the reality shows a method of operational opportunism enabled by a permissive political and battlespace-context. Hybrid warfare therefore does not merit adoption as a strategic concept, because it is not strategic. Using hybrid warfare as a strategic concept thus dilutes what we perceive to be strategic – and what we perceive to be warfare – proving the importance of testing new concepts against classical wisdom.Show less
