In this thesis the ways in which power is shaped in the Arctic among the ‘Arctic five’ states are analyzed. It is argued that the Arctic is a multipolar region, in which Russia is the most dominant...Show moreIn this thesis the ways in which power is shaped in the Arctic among the ‘Arctic five’ states are analyzed. It is argued that the Arctic is a multipolar region, in which Russia is the most dominant and other actors adopt strategies towards Russia such as soft balancing, bandwagoning, and appeasement. The thesis shows that traditional conceptions of power do not apply unequivocally to the Arctic region, because it is hard to control effectively due to its unique geographical composition. Power in the Arctic is based on the recognition of sovereign rights over an area, which will give states economic opportunities (control over waterways and resources) in the future due to melting ice. The ideal of permanence underlying modern sovereignty is absent in the changing Arctic, and sovereign rights for exploitation of an area do not give states actual sovereignty. Sovereignty disputes are therefore often unclear and create interesting power dynamics. They are resolved through institutional procedures based on international law and political geography, yet states have opportunities for negotiation and can adopt their own viewpoints on sovereignty based on what suits the national interest. Thus the Arctic provides a unique example of ‘structural power’ and the interaction between structure and agency. Due to the ever-changing nature of the Arctic, states’ interests are more future-oriented than elsewhere. The thesis concludes that while security and sovereignty have become more important in the Arctic in recent years, there is no ‘security dilemma’ because capacity building does not directly threaten other states, and military conflict does not lead to gains and is highly unlikely. Security issues are rather more specific and less concerned with warfare, and more with the environment and emergencies. The difficulty of operating in the Arctic environment compels states to cooperate through international institutions, but the ‘Arctic five’ do this to further their national interests. The interdependence of the Arctic with the system-level is traced, and it is found that states are limited in their options in the Arctic due to mutual commitments on a global scale and possible precedent effects of agreements in the Arctic.Show less
Regional integration is on the political agenda in all parts of the world. During the time of post-colonial development and liberation struggles, Southern Africa saw its share of attempts at closer...Show moreRegional integration is on the political agenda in all parts of the world. During the time of post-colonial development and liberation struggles, Southern Africa saw its share of attempts at closer economic and political ties between states within the region. Today, the dominant regional organization in Southern Africa is the Southern African Development Community. Many regional organizations in the developing world, including SADC, explicitly state that a large part of the regional integration project is towards a goal of attracting an increase in foreign direct investment. The ability to attract FDI is based on various factors; covering many of these is the combined level of perceived political risk. Economic and political instability, social unrest, ethnic and military conflict, corruption in government, the threat of expropriation and breaches of contract; political risk is a multi-faceted concept. The thesis identifies what types of political risks are prevalent in the Southern African region. The research focus addresses what SADC as a regional actor has contributed towards lowering the levels of political risk in specific countries and parts of the region. The thesis demonstrates that as theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence argue that regional integration is positive for the ability to attract FDI, Southern African countries face many obstacles on the way towards a fully integrated economic community. Meanwhile, the prospects for peace and security in the region are better at present than twenty years ago. The establishment and maintenance of legal, security and financial frameworks that would add to securing the interests of both the foreign investors and the host country and government are often lacking. Furthermore, the implementation of regional institutions have been hampered by various factors, including the member states’ own interests and a general unwillingness towards ceding sovereignty to transnational institutions . The role of South Africa as a regional hegemon and key policy-maker within SADC is discussed in order to further examine the regional dynamics in Southern Africa.Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
In this thesis the question of how the social factors of language, education and territorial concentration influence the seeking of voice at the center and/or at the periphery. This question was...Show moreIn this thesis the question of how the social factors of language, education and territorial concentration influence the seeking of voice at the center and/or at the periphery. This question was asked in the context of Ethiopia with a specific focus on one of its multi-ethnic regions, Benishangul-Gumuz by qualitatively assessing the documented evidence of the respective groups’ voice seeking behaviors. The analysis of the Ethiopian Constitution as well as the country’s distinct history implied that the selected social variables -interacting with the constitutional provisions of Amarigna as a central language, partially weak guarantees for group representation and the constitutional promise of self-rule- might influence the voice-seeking behavior of groups differently. Firstly, groups not speaking the official language as their mother tongue tend to concentrate their voice-seeking efforts in the periphery. Secondly, groups with lower educational levels appear to be more likely to demand proportionality in institutions not subject to guaranteed group representation, whereas higher educated groups tend to at least not support such demands. Finally, territorially concentrated groups potentially controlling their own territory seem to be more likely to seek a greater group voice whilst more dispersed groups sharing their territory tend to refrain from doing so.Show less
In late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which...Show moreIn late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which are known in Greek as Imia and in Turkish as Kardak. Turkey’s intentions to dispute the Greek sovereignty of those islets led to the biggest crisis between the two countries after the Turkish invasion to Cyprus. The mediation of the US finally brought the deterrence of the war which was really close as Greek and Turkish troops had gathered on the islets and close to them. The fact that there was political instability in both countries at the time of the crisis creates a big question that is still to be answered: where the reasons of this crisis political? Domestic problems sometimes lead to external conflicts and the probability of the existence of a relationship between the domestic unrest mainly in Turkey and incidentally in Greece and the Imia/Kardak crisis still remains vague. This research will try to clarify the reasons of the Imia/Kardak crisis and to examine whether the diversionary theory of war has an application in it or not. Through the analysis of this theory and the description of the political situation in both countries we will try to come to a conclusion about the political dimension of this crisis.Show less
This thesis is inspired by the will to understand why the international community stands by while mass atrocities are committed by the Syrian government. My research question ‘Why does the...Show moreThis thesis is inspired by the will to understand why the international community stands by while mass atrocities are committed by the Syrian government. My research question ‘Why does the international community not intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’ forms the premise for this thesis. My main argument is that because of the non-consensus within the international community about R2P as a norm, there is a lack of political will to intervene in the situation in Syria. Furthermore, I argue that this lack of consensus is caused by the protection of the national interests of the states involved, especially the security of their sovereignty. These arguments are substantiated by the acceptance of my hypotheses which are based on the core assumptions of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These hypotheses show that the protection of sovereignty, the lack of a common interest, and the non-consensus about R2P are crucial aspects in the decision not to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria.Show less
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated a shared interest in a military status quo in Earth orbit and exercised considerable restraint by not placing weapons in space....Show moreDuring the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated a shared interest in a military status quo in Earth orbit and exercised considerable restraint by not placing weapons in space. However, despite ever-increasing state dependency on civilian space applications, militarisation efforts have accelerated in recent decades, heightening fears that one or more states may deploy space weapons. Indeed, the catastrophic consequences of a space war appear to provide the world with an interest in keeping space conflict free but key space power states have been reluctant to implement a prohibition on weapons in space. To understand why, this paper analyses the history of space militarisation and arms control and the two most prominent explanations offered to date – that the United States has acted as a non-status quo state and that international governance has failed to deliver on its promise. Finding these unsatisfactory, the paper proposes that the absence of a space weapons prohibition is instead best understood as the product of security dilemma dynamics. These can lead even benign states with significant common interests to a self-reinforcing spiral of insecurity driven by uncertainty and fear.Show less
