In this thesis, I will discuss whether coercion theory can conform to intuitions that present generations have obligations of justice to future generations, taking those intuitions as a starting...Show moreIn this thesis, I will discuss whether coercion theory can conform to intuitions that present generations have obligations of justice to future generations, taking those intuitions as a starting point without defending them. A view which grounds obligations of justice in coercion is only able to do so when it can plausibly claim that relevant forms of coercion exist in the intergenerational realm. Only if this claim can be made, the scope of justice extends to future people. If not, the intuition cannot be accommodated and coercion theorists are faced with a dilemma: let go of the coercion view, or give up the intuition.Show less
This thesis examines whether the belief that nature has intrinsic value is compatible with an instrumental view of nature’s value in the context of the ecosystem services approach. I will argue...Show moreThis thesis examines whether the belief that nature has intrinsic value is compatible with an instrumental view of nature’s value in the context of the ecosystem services approach. I will argue that the ecosystem services approach and the belief that nature is intrinsically valuable are for the most part at odds.Show less
With the challenges of global warming and the loss of biodiversity worsening, scientists are calling for unprecedented, multi-level societal change in the next several decades, especially in...Show moreWith the challenges of global warming and the loss of biodiversity worsening, scientists are calling for unprecedented, multi-level societal change in the next several decades, especially in affluent societies. Such change is required in order to abate the worst possible consequences of societal collapse and human extinction in the coming centuries. If such change is ever to happen, a comprehensive understanding of why people would be willing to bear the costs of change in order to ensure the fate of future generations is required. Many philosophers have provided moral arguments to answer this question. In this thesis I examine the work of Samuel Scheffler who addresses this issue from a different angle, questioning whether and in what ways future generations matter to us. Scheffler argues that compelling reasons for wanting to ensure that humanity continues to thrive in the remote future are implicit in many of the things that matter to people today. I discuss various challenges to Scheffler’s work and argue that, besides minor amendments, his core claims are viable. Indeed, the survival and flourishing of humanity into the remote future matter to us in its own right and because it is a condition for our ability to live a value-laden life. Moreover, it enables us to answer our conservative desire to preserve and sustain the things that we value beyond our own lifespan. Consequently, I stress the importance of incorporating these reasons into communication strategies aimed at enhancing public support for environmental policies, as these reasons have strong motivational power.Show less
This thesis explores the realm of procreative ethics. In this thesis I provide an example of a prospective procreative couple, Ario and Linda, who wish to procreate in dire circumstances of extreme...Show moreThis thesis explores the realm of procreative ethics. In this thesis I provide an example of a prospective procreative couple, Ario and Linda, who wish to procreate in dire circumstances of extreme poverty. I claim that the future child they wish to create (Zaine) will be wronged by their deliberate decision to bring about his life. They wrong this child in the sense that; 1.) they do not have the capability to provide the future child with a minimally adequate standard of upbringing; and 2.) they violate this future child’s birthright to a minimally decent life. Procreating into the dire conditions of extreme poverty prevents this child from enjoying this birthright. Therefore, Linda and Ario, in their procreative circumstances, create this child in such a way as to violate his birthright. They wrong the child in their procreative decision to bring about his life. Chapter one of this essay explores the Non-Identity Problem which poses significant justificatory hurdles if one is to claim that a future child can be wronged by being brought into existence. Chapter two builds on a non-consequentialist approach (introduced in chapter one) to wrongdoing wherein I adopt a deontic principle constraining the procreative right of potential procreators. This deontic principle claims that potential procreators have a duty to provide any offspring they create with an adequate standard of upbringing (section 2.0). Moreover, I will adopt and defend the position that a future child has a birthright to a minimally decent life (section 2.1). Furthermore, I provide, and defend, a threshold standard of existence that illustrates when a life should be considered less than minimally decent (section 2.2). Chapter three is utilized to respond to a number of objections in light of the claim I have proposed.Show less
A thesis about individual responsibility for collective action problems and more specifically anthropogenic global climate change. This thesis tries to refute claims made by Walter Sinnott...Show moreA thesis about individual responsibility for collective action problems and more specifically anthropogenic global climate change. This thesis tries to refute claims made by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on individual causal inefficacy.Show less
One of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1...Show moreOne of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1 are only applicable in domestic set-tings while cosmopolitans argue for a broader nonrelationist applicability of these principles in the international sphere. I will acknowledge that the state has normative peculiarity but also claim that there are other grounds of justice, both relational and nonrelational, that plea for more demanding general obligations of justice towards other peoples or states. These duties are based on principles of justice since they are more stringent and en-forceable than current statist views on foreign policies. I will oppose the narrow statist view and argue instead for a broader application of principles of justice. Relying on grounds or domains of justice allows us to leave the unilateral discussion between relationists (statists) and nonrelationists (cosmopolitans) for both do not succeed in capturing an accurate, complete account of international justice. Distinguishing different grounds of justice will show how the exact nature of a relationship determines what principles of justice are applicable for which agents. I will also show how this alternative approach is helpful in the challenging debate of noncompliance and questions on who is to pick up the slack that is left by noncomplying agents. The main argument I will thus make is that liberal statists have reasons to endorse more demanding international duties of justice. My aim is twofold: first to show inconsistencies in statist theory and second to explain how statist approaches are compatible with endorsing other, more demanding duties of global justice.Show less
This thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into...Show moreThis thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into Rawlsian political liberalism involves an examination of the way in which political liberals have responded to the objections raised by critics of the theory. Through analysing the problem of asymmetry in political liberalism, this thesis argues that political liberalism is only able to remain viable on the basis of the notion of reasonableness, which characterises the group of highly idealised, reasonable citizens. These citizens are immensely important to political liberalism, since they have the role of deliberating on and justifying the political conception of justice. In order for political liberalism to remain a tenable account of how agreement can be reached on the principles of justice, the idea of reasonableness requires justification. Political liberals attempt to accomplish this by appealing to the public political culture, and the shared political ideas found within it, which all democratically-aligned citizens will endorse. This thesis also argues that such a claim cannot be made, since the political ideas are subject to interpretation and thus not shared. It is also illustrated that political liberals cannot ground their theory in the support of committed democrats, since disagreement over the ideas of democracy and reasonableness are likely. After concluding that political liberalism cannot be defended, the last chapter of this thesis focuses upon a perfectionist liberalism, which Rawls argues must be rejected. This thesis argues that, on the contrary, perfectionist liberalism may be able to overcome the problems that political liberals associate with it.Show less
Given that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first...Show moreGiven that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first examines the existing philosophical literature on this concept. It argues that this literature does not offer us a proper understanding of self-respect, treating it as an exclusively normative notion, while failing to consider its non-normative, empirical facet. By drawing on recent scientific research, it shows that there is an essentially natural component to self-respect, thereby pointing out a gap in the existing philosophical literature. Moreover, it argues that this natural component has to be taken into account, not just in order to properly understand this concept, but also to determine its place in a theory of justice. So, what is the place of self-respect in a theory of justice? Zooming in on John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, this thesis shows that Rawls only focussed on securing the social bases of self-respect, but failed to properly acknowledge its essentially natural component. Consequentially, Rawls failed to fully comprehend the fundamental difference between selfrespect and other social primary goods, failed to recognise the limits to treating self-respect as a distribuendum, and most seriously, failed to properly compensate citizens suffering from a natural deficiency of self-respect. This leads to the view that self-respect should be understood as a metric of justice instead of as a distribuendum. Lastly, this thesis asks how a theory of justice should treat those who are pessimistically predisposed, and as a result lack self-respect. It shows that these citizens can to at least some extent develop their self-respect. However, it also shows that in order to properly support citizens’ self-respect, one should not think and speak in terms of compensating them for some ‘disadvantage’, but in terms of affirming their equal worth and allowing them to live a worthy life. It concludes that while Dworkin’s luck egalitarian theory fails on the ideal and non-ideal level, and Anderson’s relational egalitarian theory fails on the non-ideal level, incorporating the constructive critique offered by Sen’s capabilities approach would make Rawls’ theory of justice optimally conducive to securing citizens’ self-respect.Show less
This thesis argues that sustainability as a desideratum of a theory of distributive justice can sometimes help decide what currency we should accept. This applies to the case of two widely...Show moreThis thesis argues that sustainability as a desideratum of a theory of distributive justice can sometimes help decide what currency we should accept. This applies to the case of two widely discussed currency approaches of distributive justice: primary goods and capabilities, both of which are involved in an endless debate on which is best as a currency of distributive justice. I argue that sustainability is necessary for any currency of justice, and that when it is taken into account it is capabilities which come out as victorious against the primary goods. The reason for this is because capabilities can help us think in terms of stability and resilience, key requirements of a sustainable currency of distributive justice.Show less
This thesis explores whether the killing of animals for human consumption is permissible and the moral limits of this permissibility. I am going to propose and evaluate an argument as to why it is...Show moreThis thesis explores whether the killing of animals for human consumption is permissible and the moral limits of this permissibility. I am going to propose and evaluate an argument as to why it is permissible to slaughter farm animals if this does not harm them. It is called the permissibility of larding argument. I will also look at several possible objections against this view. The most important objection is that if a lack of harm can make the killing of animals permissible, than it would also be permissible to kill humans if it does not harm them. Another fundamental issue I will call the baseline of comparison objection. A final issue has to deal with the credibility of the first premise of the argument, which is that every wrong involves harming. I will conclude that the permissibility of larding argument is untenable because it does not hold up well against the baseline of comparison objection and the objection to the first premise.Show less
It seems to have become a tendency to focus on the negative consequences of higher migration flows. More open borders would supposedly undermine the sovereignty of states and lead to an unfavorable...Show moreIt seems to have become a tendency to focus on the negative consequences of higher migration flows. More open borders would supposedly undermine the sovereignty of states and lead to an unfavorable lack of control over who enters the country and who does not. Yet I believe there are many good reasons to defend looser border controls and actually far fewer reasons to support strict immigration policies. The conviction with which almost every country in the world defends the right to leave a country, while they simultaneously resist to acknowledge a subsequent right to enter another country, is suprising to me. As Phillip Cole pointed out “one cannot consistently assert that there is a fundamental human right to emigration but no such right to immigration; the liberal asymmetry position is morally ethical, but also conceptually incoherent” (Cole, 2000, 46). Cole argues that in case of nation state, the right to exit one’s state is dependent upon entry elsewhere because there is no livable ‘space’ of statelessness (2011, 203-204). I share the same conviction that the notions of depart and entrance are conceptually intertwined. An analysis of the concept of rights, duties and democratic legitimacy will demonstrate that there is a moral right to leave and a subsequent moral right to enter a country.Show less
This thesis argues that, based on a deontological rights-based approach, meat production should decrease. There has been convincing research to argue that current industrial farming methods for...Show moreThis thesis argues that, based on a deontological rights-based approach, meat production should decrease. There has been convincing research to argue that current industrial farming methods for meat are unsustainable, but there has been little research on the relationship between meat production and poverty levels, and what (if anything) this means for states and their moral duties. This paper is divided into two parts; firstly, it explains the causal link between meat consumption and poverty, and introduces the Capability Approach. Secondly, it looks at how governments can undertake this challenge: soft, monetary and coercive measures are evaluated. I conclude that not only is there good reason for states to reduce meat consumption, but many have the wherewithal to successfully do it, and therefore prove to be a crucial part of the process.Show less
In this analysis into political and moral philosophy, the author argues that non-state actors could, under the right conditions, be considered morally and politically legitimate in carrying out a...Show moreIn this analysis into political and moral philosophy, the author argues that non-state actors could, under the right conditions, be considered morally and politically legitimate in carrying out a humanitarian intervention. This is done by assuming a minimal theory of universal human rights and then looking further into the contemporary literature surrounding humanitarian intervention as well as its history and application. In doing so, there does not seem to be moral, conceptual, or legal boundaries that would disallow such an intervention if carried out under the specified conditions. The implications of such a non-state humanitarian actor could change the way in which humanitarian interventions are carried out and remove or reduce the primacy of the state oriented nature of such interventions. Alec J. Bowie (2016) “The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors in Humanitarian Intervention”, Leiden Student RepositoryShow less
