Outgroup helping serves various strategic motives, for example to communicate ingroup warmth and competence. However, unsolicited help is not always beneficial for the recipient, as it could cause...Show moreOutgroup helping serves various strategic motives, for example to communicate ingroup warmth and competence. However, unsolicited help is not always beneficial for the recipient, as it could cause feelings of inferiority and incompetence. Furthermore, it is not always judged positively by third party observers. This study investigated how third party observers judge outgroup helping with a motive to appear either moral or social. Based on literature on moral hypocrisy and tainted altruism, it was expected that help providers with a strategic motive to appear moral would be judged more negatively compared to help providers with a strategic motive to appear social. A scenario experiment was conducted, in which participants (N = 209) read a scenario in which the motive to offer help (e.g. to appear moral or social) and whether this was in line with whom they really are (reality congruence) was manipulated. The results confirmed that participants judged the help providers more negatively when the motive to provide help was incongruent with how they really are. However, unexpectedly, help providers who helped an outgroup in order to present themselves as being moral, were not judged more negatively compared to help providers who helped outgroup members in order to appear social. These results are at odds with literature on moral hypocrisy, which describes that it would be perceived as hypocrite when one would lie about being moral, because morality comprises traits such as honesty and integrity. The results suggest that morality and sociability are not as independent as previously thought.Show less
This paper investigated the effectiveness of three compensation schemes (a mixed institutionalized, a fully institutionalized and a voluntary compensation scheme) in achieving project acceptance in...Show moreThis paper investigated the effectiveness of three compensation schemes (a mixed institutionalized, a fully institutionalized and a voluntary compensation scheme) in achieving project acceptance in the case of a wind energy project development. Here, bribery perceptions and perceived involvement of local residents were looked at as potential mediators. Furthermore, it was examined whether the trust reputation of the project developer influenced the effect of compensation schemes on project acceptance, as well as on the possible mediators. An experimental scenario study (N = 361) with a 3 (Institutionalization: Fully-institutionalized vs. mixed-institutionalized, vs. voluntary) x 2 (Reputation: Good vs. bad) factorial between-subjects design was conducted with project acceptance, perceived involvement and bribery perception as dependent variables. A mixed institutionalized compensation scheme was expected to lead to higher levels of project acceptance, irrespective of the project developers’ trust reputation. Moreover, a fully institutionalized compensation scheme was expected to lead to more project acceptance than a voluntary compensation scheme in the case of a project developer with a bad reputation but not for one with a good reputation. The results provided limited evidence regarding the effectivity of the compensation schemes in achieving high project acceptance. Contrary to expectations, a voluntary scheme resulted in more project acceptance than a fully institutionalized scheme. This effect was explained by the voluntary scheme leading to more perceived involvement which in turn increased project acceptance. Additionally, the analyses showed that a good trust reputation results in higher project acceptance through reduced bribery perceptions and increased perceived involvement.Show less
Community compensation may be offered in return for the adverse local costs of wind farms. In this experimental scenario study, 361 British participants took the position of a resident facing this...Show moreCommunity compensation may be offered in return for the adverse local costs of wind farms. In this experimental scenario study, 361 British participants took the position of a resident facing this hypothetical situation. They learned that the project developer had a positive or negative reputation, and that compensation was being offered by one of three approaches: voluntarily, institutionalized through law, or by a mix of the latter with local involvement in the decision regarding compensation amount. Regardless of the project developer’s reputation, it was predicted that the mixed approach would result in higher local wind farm acceptance, compared to the other approaches. The local acceptance level was expected to be moderated by reputation for the voluntary approach: with a negative reputation leading to lower local acceptance compared to the fully institutionalized approach. Finally, the effects of project developer reputation and compensation approach on local wind farm acceptance were predicted to be mediated by perceptions of bribery and local involvement. The results demonstrated that voluntarily providing compensation led to greater local wind farm acceptance than institutionalizing compensation, whilst the mixed approach did not differ from either approach. When a negative reputation was made salient, the mixed approach resulted in greater bribery perceptions than both of the other approaches. Lastly, a partial mediation indicated the importance of project developer reputation for wind farm sitings: with a positive reputation found to elicit lower bribery perceptions, higher perceived involvement, and as a result, greater overall local wind farm acceptance, than a negative reputation.Show less
Gentle dominance is a motive for a group with a relative higher status to seek help from a group with a relative lower status. It combines a desire to improve the relationship between the groups,...Show moreGentle dominance is a motive for a group with a relative higher status to seek help from a group with a relative lower status. It combines a desire to improve the relationship between the groups, while trying to maintain the superior position of the high-status group. This could also distract the low-status group from the status difference. We expected that in order for gentle dominance to occur, the status difference between the two groups should not be likely to change (stable) and the two groups should have to share a part of their identities (common identity). To test this, we set up an online survey in which participants read a description of a situation in which the stability and identity of a pair of high- and low-status groups was manipulated. In this scenario the high-status group had to ask for help from the low-status group. The participants (N = 212), who served as observers of this situation, had to indicate on a questionnaire to what extent different possible motives for asking for help applied to the situation. The motives were: Gentle dominance, inclusion, superiority, actual help, assistance and exploitation. For each of the six motives an ANOVA on stability and identity was carried out and no significant effects were found. We concluded that stability and identity did not have an effect on the perception of the six motives. This is possibly because participants were not directly involved in the scenario. Further research is needed on this relatively new topic.Show less
