Populism has been on the rise across liberal democracies and has been closely linked with the ero-sion of democratic institutions and standards. However there have also been links made between...Show morePopulism has been on the rise across liberal democracies and has been closely linked with the ero-sion of democratic institutions and standards. However there have also been links made between populism’s effect on an individual’s trust in institutions. Considering the contemporary importance of international organisations and the rise of populism, we seek to understand the effect populism has on trust in international organisations. We make use of the European Values Study to our two hypotheses. We find that populists are predicted to have a lower degree of trust in the European Union and United Nations compared to non-populists. Moreover, we find that populists’ trust in international organisations is expected to increase when a populist party is in government, compared to only being in opposition. Our findings suggest that populism poses a challenge to the continued legitimacy of international governmental organisations, and policymakers should seek to continue fostering greater public confidence.Show less
In an increasingly globalized world, international organizations remain important to coordinate the need for global cooperation and collective action. In order to give adequate responses to a...Show moreIn an increasingly globalized world, international organizations remain important to coordinate the need for global cooperation and collective action. In order to give adequate responses to a plethora of wicked problems, international organizations need to be given more sovereignty and decision-making powers. This clashes directly with the need of national governments to retain their sovereignty. These clashes can lead to a decrease in legitimacy for the IO and give rise to nationalism, and in the most extreme cases to democratic backsliding. Democracy promoting IOs unintentionally help democratic backsliding in member states when they do not design proper democracy promoting tools and mechanisms. I mix process tracing and discourse analysis to look at the influence of democracy promoting mechanisms of IOs on member states who experience democratic backsliding. I demonstrate my case by looking at the application and results of the conditionality mechanism of the EU on Poland and Hungary. The conditionality mechanism focuses mainly on 1) constitution, 2) rule of law, 3) civil and minority rights, 4) the independence of the judiciary and the media, and 5) the separation of power within government. Of these, I focus on the effects of the conditionality mechanism on 4) the independence of the judiciary and the media. I find that the conditionality mechanism mainly influenced changes in the independence of the judiciary. This influence was also seen back in the resilience and recovery proposals from Hungary and Poland, where both countries pledged to pass legislation to increase the independence of the judiciary. Based on this I argue that the amount of democracy promoting mechanisms does not matter, as long as the impact of the mechanism is strong enough for democracy promotionShow less
The influence of right-wing populist ideology on governments has increased over the past two decades and these developments are still ongoing in several countries over the world. Right-wing...Show moreThe influence of right-wing populist ideology on governments has increased over the past two decades and these developments are still ongoing in several countries over the world. Right-wing populist politics is often characterized by values of anti-pluralism and anti-elite, which threaten diverse, inclusive, and open societies. These influences in the form of populistic pressures may lead to democratic backsliding and can have far-reaching consequences on the administrative apparatus and political-administrative relations. Top civil servants as main actors within the democratic constitutional state and the civil service are important in safeguarding day-to-day governance and in dealing with populistic pressures and preventing democratic backsliding. This research, therefore, focuses on the perceptions and expectations of top civil servants regarding which strategies and actions a government with a populistic signature will adopt and subsequently the response of civil servants to these pressures. The findings show that the absolute majority of top civil servants expect that a government with a populist signature will adopt strategies and actions about centralization of both structure and resources and regarding the politicization of both norms and personnel. Furthermore, most top civil servants are neutral regarding their expectations of whether civil servants will respond. They consider it most likely that civil servants will resign, closely followed by speaking out against the policy. They find it more likely that civil servants will have a response than not respond, and finally, expect that civil servants will not be loyal to a populist government when dealing with populistic pressures.Show less
Since WWII, the influence of IOs has increased where virtually all issue of global concern is administered by an IO. However, this influence has not come without its hazards. As the Global ...Show moreSince WWII, the influence of IOs has increased where virtually all issue of global concern is administered by an IO. However, this influence has not come without its hazards. As the Global “Governance Dilemma” theorizes, it is because of it that member states wish to ‘capture’ their decision-making and power-distribution apparatuses —their voting systems— to better realize their agendas. The case studies of two prominent IOs, the IMF and the UNSC, provide support that it is often true that these systems favor powerful member states due to a politicization of their voting systems. To address the potential causes and shortcomings of this phenomenon, this thesis conducted an in-depth case study of the institutional designs —Virtue Cultivation, Political Autonomy, and Meritocracy— of the Colombian Political Party MIRA that were born out of their unique theoretical framework of Miraísm. Through the implementation of these designs, this party successfully overcame obstacles akin to the ones that IOs face, despite their small size and the prevalence of corruption in Colombia. Building from this, the thesis followed a standard method of theory generation to create a novel framework regarding how to better resolve the core issue at hand: The Aligned Interests-Goals (AIG) Theory. In essence, this theory postulates that through specific institutional designs that tie A (self-interests) and B (goals) together by offering C (incentives) that provide the obtainment of A in exchange for proven efforts regarding B can effectively nudge behavior towards a virtuous cycle of positive competition for their mutual satisfaction. Based on the logic of this theory, the thesis delivered its main institutional proposal of Incentives-based Meritocratic Voting Systems as an alternative design to avoid the adverse consequences of politicized voting systems in IOs, while leaving prospect for the avoidance of absolute insulation from powerful member states, therefore increasing the probability for effective results regarding IO goals of intergovernmental cooperation, sacrifice, and change.Show less
