Piketty claims the inequality of wealth is increasing and that this will cause problems of justice. Even though he might be right in his first claim, he has been criticized that he lacks the proper...Show morePiketty claims the inequality of wealth is increasing and that this will cause problems of justice. Even though he might be right in his first claim, he has been criticized that he lacks the proper moral arguments to defend his second claim. Yet, that does not mean he is wrong. To demonstrate why inequality of wealth is unjust, I will first need to determine what justice requires. To do so, I will examine Dworkin’s and Anderson’s theory of justice. I will argue that following either Dworkin or Anderson, Piketty is right and the current level of wealth inequality is unjust. Therefore, justice requires us to do something to reduce inequality. I will assert that a direct taxation of wealth is the best tool to do so. To examine how this would work out in practice, I will analyse the situation in the Netherlands. I will show that current wealth tax rates are strikingly low, but that merely increasing these rates would not work as a solution as people are poorly informed and use fallacious moral arguments. For that reason, I will follow Prabkahar in my conclusion that as a first step, it is essential to make people aware of the workings of taxation.Show less
The implementation of an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) would eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, enhance welfare and help us face automatization. However, one of the main objections is that...Show moreThe implementation of an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) would eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, enhance welfare and help us face automatization. However, one of the main objections is that people will free ride on a UBI, making it morally unacceptable and economically unfeasible. The moral objection holds that it is unfair for anyone to receive a UBI at the expense of others who contribute to it, without being obligated to make some proportional contribution in return or be condemned otherwise. The economic objection holds that a UBI is not feasible, because rational people will stop working or attempt to evade taxes; both of which are needed to finance a UBI. Advocates of a UBI have argued that the number of free riders is expected to be limited, but they have failed to offer a theoretical framework of human behaviour which supports these arguments. The so-called Logic of Reciprocity is such a framework. Therefore, we ask the question in this thesis ‘How can we find a solution to the collective action problem of economic feasibility of a UBI if we follow the Logic of Reciprocity? Does this model of human behaviour allow us to overcome the free rider objection of economic feasibility against a UBI?’. Subsequently, we ask the question ‘Can the moral benefits of a UBI outweigh the violation of the reciprocity principle to mitigate the moral free rider objection?’. We defend the claim that a UBI is economically feasible under high levels of trust. In addition, we defend the claim that this mitigates the weight of the moral free rider objection. In the first chapter, we establish that a UBI faces a collective action problem of economic feasibility; a UBI is a desirable collective good which cannot be achieved through collective action due to the rational free riding behaviour not to work or pay taxes. In the second chapter, we discuss two models of human behaviour to review the underlying assumptions of the collective action problem of economic feasibility. The Logic of Collective Action supports the core assumption that humans behave rationally and will always defect. The alternative Logic of Reciprocity argues that humans are moral and emotional reciprocators who defect or cooperate based on the perceived behaviour of others. We conclude that the Logic of Reciprocity offers a more accurate prediction of human behaviour in collective action. In the third chapter, we apply the Logic of Reciprocity to the collective action problem of economic feasibility of a UBI. We conclude that under high levels of trust, the majority of people will be motivated to be seen as good and cooperative and feel reassured that they will not be taken advantage of. Thus, the majority of people will continue to work and pay taxes upon receiving a UBI, making the implementation of a UBI economically feasible. Subsequently, we argue that, once a UBI is economically feasible, the harm caused by the limited number of free riders is minor compared to the harm caused by free riding behaviour in the absence of a UBI. We conclude that the moral benefits of a UBI outweigh the violation of the reciprocity principle, thus mitigating the moral objection. To achieve and maintain a high level of trust, we recommend a positive narrative, transparency of cooperation levels and limited social incentives targeted clearly at dedicated free riders.Show less
Philip Pettit’s modern republican theory is a fundamental project, which seeks to rearrange the system of social and political institutions in order to provide and defend freedom as non-domination....Show morePhilip Pettit’s modern republican theory is a fundamental project, which seeks to rearrange the system of social and political institutions in order to provide and defend freedom as non-domination. The thesis examines Pettit’s idea of contestatory democracy as the basic means of promoting freedom as non-domination in the republic. The paper argues that within Pettit’s framework the rights to political participation are turned into duties. Due to this fact, the republican conditions create a disadvantaged position for certain groups and individuals, who find political participation absolutely unacceptable for themselves. The thesis concludes that this disadvantaged position can be considered as dominated in Pettit’s own terms. This conclusion questions the overall success of the project designed for provision of freedom as non-domination.Show less
Extreme weather events, natural disasters and failure in mitigating or adapting to the changing climate. All these societal risks have become more likely and impactful over the last couple of...Show moreExtreme weather events, natural disasters and failure in mitigating or adapting to the changing climate. All these societal risks have become more likely and impactful over the last couple of decades. It is important to limit the excessive human emission of greenhouse gases such as CO2, because they contribute to the changing climate. In order to gain support for CO2 reduction policies, environmental concerns must be reconciled with the prevailing political ideology. The focus is on liberal democracy because it is the dominant political system in western society. One of the difficulties in combining environmental concerns with liberal democracy is that policies to protect nature put limits on what people are allowed to do and thereby limit the individual liberty of citizens. In this thesis I investigate witch CO2 policies fit best with Liberal-democratic positions about the environment. I will answer the following questions: Why does the market fail to ensure an efficient amount of CO2 emissions? Which kind of CO2 reduction policies are most suitable to reduce excessive emissions? How can CO2 policies be combined with liberal democratic values? Which policy is preferable based on liberal democratic positions about the environment? The two most discussed market-based CO2 policies are excise tax and emission trading. This thesis argues for an integrated approach, formed by both policies. This system is preferable because it internalizes externalities to reduce excessive emissions, and simultaneously enforces a maximum amount of emissions to prevent an environmental crisis.Show less
The thesis concerns an important practical and normative issue: why and how should we engage with development aid. It argues that states (as opposed to citizens and individuals) have a duty to do...Show moreThe thesis concerns an important practical and normative issue: why and how should we engage with development aid. It argues that states (as opposed to citizens and individuals) have a duty to do so; that the way it is often given is counter-productive, paternalistic, and unfair. The thesis concludes that an FRBA (fundamental rights-based approach) shows how states and their citizens should discharge the duties that the right to development bestows on them.Show less
In In Defense of Anarchism, Robert Paul Wolff claims that a legitimate authority cannot exist, as any authority will necessarily prevent its subject’s autonomy. Jospeh Raz, in contrast, argues that...Show moreIn In Defense of Anarchism, Robert Paul Wolff claims that a legitimate authority cannot exist, as any authority will necessarily prevent its subject’s autonomy. Jospeh Raz, in contrast, argues that a legitimate authority can exist and should support its subjects’ autonomy. In the argumentation to defend their conclusions, both focus on formulating their conceptions of (legitimate) authority. In this paper, I argue that the difference in their conceptions of autonomy is the basis of the disagreement in Wolff’s and Raz’s conclusions. After a comparison of the two conceptions and the role autonomy plays in the authors’ argumentations, I conclude that Raz’s conclusion is the more plausible of the two.Show less
A research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion...Show moreA research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion given by Michael Huemer was correct. Huemer argues that modern states lack political legitimacy and that citizens cannot be forced to oblige the state’s laws. He is convinced that societies would be better if they are stateless. The thesis followed Huemer's claims. In order to answer the research question, Thomas Hobbes was discussed as a defender of the state. Furthermore, Robert Nozick was used to test Huemer's argument. Nozick has similar claims, but he reaches a different conclusion. This thesis concludes that Huemer is not correct and that even by accepting his optimistic assumptions, the state, be it a minimal one, remains inevitable.Show less
Deze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn...Show moreDeze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn preferenties beïnvloeden niet heeft afgewezen, of niet zou hebben afgewezen indien hij de mogelijkheid had deze preferenties af te wijzen. Benson bekritiseert dit model aan de hand van socialisering. Socialisering doet mensen preferenties niet afwijzen, ook als zij dit wel hadden gedaan zonder socialisering. Wat Benson betreft zijn deze mensen niet autonoom ten aanzien van preferenties die het gevolg zijn van socialisering, ook al hebben zij het proces van socialisering nooit afgewezen. Deze scriptie voegt drie elementen toe aan de discussie. Ten eerste wil wordt Bensons kritiek verbreed door te stellen dat deze niet slechts geldt voor socialisering, maar dat bijna al onze reflectie is beïnvloed door externe factoren. Daarnaast wordt uitgelegd hoe dit betekent dat Christmans model (impliciet) een eigen zelf veronderstelt, los van externe factoren. Tot slot wordt de onenigheid tussen beide auteurs verklaard door te stellen dat beiden een andere intuïtie van autonomie articuleren.Show less
Introduction Money used to be simple. Everybody liked the shiny yellow metal we now call gold. However, at a certain point, some so-called ‘states’ made the whole practice of exchanging gold rather...Show moreIntroduction Money used to be simple. Everybody liked the shiny yellow metal we now call gold. However, at a certain point, some so-called ‘states’ made the whole practice of exchanging gold rather more complicated, as they issued vouchers that were said to ‘represent’ an amount of gold. Even more farfetched was their later decision to cut any links between our metal of desire and the vouchers we got accustomed to. In the present day, our vouchers often lack any physical qualities, and seem to be nothing more than digits projected on a computer screen. It is perhaps remarkable that the proverbial man or woman in the street does not at all seem to be concerned with how abstract our money really is. Its omnipresence and utility have made almost every inhabitant on earth comfortable using it. We hardly reflect on its nature anymore. And so, now that an entirely novel type of money – cryptomoney – is coming to the forefront, we are quick to accept it as just another incarnation of a phenomenon that we have been familiar with ever since we started appreciating a certain shiny yellow metal. But I believe this to be a mistake. Cryptomoney has the potential to transform our financial system just as radically as the move from gold and silver to fiat money, or the abandonment of the gold standard once did. This is because there are certain qualities to cryptomoney that are fundamentally different from the money as we know it. It seems, however, that although some people are interested in comparing different types of money from an economic standpoint, not many care about the philosophical implications of choosing one system over another. I believe this to be a second mistake. The economist Leonidas Zelmanovitz is right when he says that ‘the value of any monetary policy is contingent on its adherence to a coherent set of philosophical assumptions’. But this works both ways, and we should also not neglect how our philosophical assumptions are challenged by the sort of money we use. If cryptomoney would make it harder for us to adhere to our ideas about justice, equality, fairness etc. that underlie our financial system, we should try to prevent it from gaining too much prominence. The question that lies at the origin of this investigation is the following: should we want to replace ‘traditional’ money with cryptomoney? The answer to this question will be negative: in this paper I will argue that it is impossible to replace traditional currencies with any form of cryptomoney and not as a direct result undermine national sovereignty and increase inequality within countries, and between them. The former is under threat because of the decentralized market-based nature of cryptomoney that leaves powerless governmental tools to execute monetary policy. The latter is the result of the disproportionate advantage more affluent people and countries will gain over their poorer equivalents as a consequence of the way cryptomoney works. If we see the consequences of these two effects through, we arrive at the conclusion that any form of replacement of traditional money by cryptomoney means a redistribution of power from (democratic) states to the market, from people to algorithms, from economically less developed countries to economically more developed countries, and from the poor to the rich. Such a redistribution, I will argue, is unjust and undermines the legitimacy of states. To support this conclusion, I have divided this thesis in four chapters. In chapter one, I will answer the questions what money is and how cryptomoney is a separate subset of the money family. A definition of cryptomoney will also be provided, as there are many virtual phenomena called cryptomoney that are really something else. Through this definition we will come to see that cryptomoney functions quite differently from the money we use today. And because cryptomoney’s ability to change our society stems in part from its technicalities, I will then give a concise explanation of how cryptomoney works. One of the really novel aspects of cryptomoney is the way it is safeguarded against fraud. The technology that does this, the ‘blockchain’, is the reason why cryptomoney could be the first serious competitor to national currencies since gold. Important as this all is, we will not discuss the mathematical or programmers’ side of cryptomoney in detail; it has been done elsewhere. Rather, we move on to the second chapter and discuss the consequences that a financial regime based on cryptomoney would have for states and individual users. We refrain from giving too strong a normative judgment here, and merely list and explain some of the most important practical advantages and disadvantages that the introduction of cryptomoney could have, in order to better understand why cryptomoney is so attractive to some of its proponents. In chapters three and four we shift our attention to the main question of the thesis: is cryptomoney a good idea? Now there might be many arguments that could be given either for or against using cryptomoney, and some of these will be discussed in chapter two. Many of these arguments, however, are mostly pragmatic in nature, and therefore not very interesting for a philosophical inquiry. Others do merit more thorough examination, but are contingent on the type of cryptocurrency used. However, there are two arguments against cryptomoney that are rather more substantial. In chapter three, we will explain why cryptomoney necessarily undermines national sovereignty, and why that would be bad. Chapter four does the same for equality. These arguments hold for any form of cryptomoney as defined in chapter one, as they are the direct result of the way cryptomoney functions. Furthermore, they transcend all pragmatic arguments, because of the strong commitment many of us have to sovereignty and equality. Naturally, not everyone believes in these values. And although I will give some arguments in favour of sovereignty and equality, this thesis does not have the explicit aim to convince those that a priori disagree with me that these two principles are desirable. There are many libertarians and anarchists who are outright opposed to the basic idea of statehood, and do not think that national sovereignty is worthwhile at all. Likewise, there are some who claim that (some sort of) inequality has utility, usually because it yields a desired effect. For some niche thinkers it could even be good in itself. This paper might not be for them. Of course, many of cryptomoney’s (dis)advantages will only become apparent in a future where cryptomoney sheds its volatile state and blossoms into a type of money on par with the money we have now. That it could come that far is an underlying assumption for this research. It is made plausible throughout, and in chapter one especially. Interest in cryptomoney surges and it has already proven to be a very popular type of artificially created money. At the same time, it would be folly to claim that we are on the brink of a true cryptomoney revolution. The trade volume of all cryptocurrencies combined is still quite small, and no single currency, not even the (in)famous bitcoin, is anywhere near a position where it could start replacing even the weakest of national currencies. So uncertain is the future in fact, that it is even possible that we are already past the peak of cryptomoney. And that would then actually be a good thing, as an ascension of cryptomoney will lead to an increase of the problems noted in chapter three and four. In a way, you could say that this inquiry aims to make itself obsolete, because in the end it argues that cryptomoney would be bad for us. Still, if we manage to keep the use of cryptomoney at bay, and all the different cryptocurrencies lose their value, that would not mean that the phenomenon could not still be valuable as a hypothetical alternative to traditional money, capable of shedding light on our current monetary institutions and the normative foundations on which these are based.Show less
This paper criticizes the theory that runs through Searle's two books on social ontology, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010). This theory is critized along...Show moreThis paper criticizes the theory that runs through Searle's two books on social ontology, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010). This theory is critized along the following lines: (1) it does not cover all that we would properly call 'the social world' and (2) on the parts that it does cover, Searle's conception of collective intentionality causes it to be, in important respects, self-defeating. Finally, the case is made for a theory on the social world that pays more mind to the human experience of that social world. Had Searle paid more attention to the human experience when constructing his theory, the above two lines of criticism may not have been applicable in the first place.Show less
Thaler and Sunstein argue that applying nudges to people’s everyday decision-making will steer them towards making a decision that will benefit their health, wealth and wellbeing. Thaler and...Show moreThaler and Sunstein argue that applying nudges to people’s everyday decision-making will steer them towards making a decision that will benefit their health, wealth and wellbeing. Thaler and Sunstein argue people need help when making a decision because they have bounded rationality, lack in self-control and are easily influenced by others. By having a nudge function like a GPS system, people’s ends are respected, while also making sure the ends pursued are benefitting their lives. When applying nudges, Thaler and Sunstein do not differentiate between nudges infringing on people’s autonomy differently. It will be suggested to distinguish three degrees of nudging. These degrees vary in their impact on people, infringing on their autonomy differently. This thesis will argue that, despite their own intentions, Thaler and Sunstein fail the conditions of their theory of nudging by allowing third-degree nudges to be applied to people’s decision-making process. In doing so, they fail to uphold their condition of transparency, precluding people from making a rational, autonomous decision. By aiming at the emotional response of the nudgee, their target, the safety-valve, or the option not to go with a nudge, is made invisible and inaccessible. Despite this, Thaler and Sunstein still allow third-degree nudges, limiting people's freedom of choice, thus allowing an unjust infringement on their autonomy. For this reason, this thesis will argue that third-degree nudges should be objected. First and second-degree nudges, however, are deemed permissible to be applied to the decision-making process of adults.Show less
In modern political philosophy, utilitarianism is often considered a road once tried and found wanting. A major reason for this is the eminence of John Rawls' Theory of Justice, which provides a...Show moreIn modern political philosophy, utilitarianism is often considered a road once tried and found wanting. A major reason for this is the eminence of John Rawls' Theory of Justice, which provides a number of arguments against it. One of them is the separateness of persons objection, which accuses utilitarianism of viewing separate persons as one, and thus considers the happiness of individuals freely aggregateable and interchangeable. This, it is thought, results in unacceptable consequences in matters of distribution. Similar criticisms are found in the works of Scanlon and Nozick. In this thesis I argue that the separateness of persons argument only works if interpreted as a weak argument against moral aggregation, and that a type of utilitarianism, restricted to political domain and informed by the practical limitations of human nature and the possibilities available to the utilitarian state, can deal with this objections.Show less
