The question of minority treatment, and illiberal minority treatment in particular, is an often contended subject among political philosophers. As most Western liberal democracies are multicultural...Show moreThe question of minority treatment, and illiberal minority treatment in particular, is an often contended subject among political philosophers. As most Western liberal democracies are multicultural it seems that this topic will remain relevant for a long time to come. This thesis presents the arguments of both autonomy liberalism and toleration liberalism in respect to the treatment of illiberal cultures within a liberal democratic state. While the arguments for toleration-based approach to liberalism are acknowledged and discussed, I devote a significant portion of this work to the defence of personal autonomy as the fundamental value within liberalism, as well as a value necessary to be acknowledged even by illiberal immigrant groups residing within a liberal democracy. Literature on the subject by well-established political philosophers is often focused solely on examples relevant to the United States of America, Canada or United Kingdom. The scope of this thesis is aimed at cases and national minorities relevant to Western Europe. The limits to toleration of illiberal minorities, which I establish in chapter 3, are in large part influenced by my understanding of personal autonomy as the fundamental value of liberalism, as well as by my interpretation of Raz's perception of personal value in both liberal and illiberal states. The differentiation of national minorities relevant to Europe from those relevant to the American continent is the focus for selecting the guiding principles for the evaluation of self-government claims of said minorities, a topic to which the entire chapter 4 is devoted.Show less
The body of liberalism needs defending in a world increasingly hostile to liberal states, but the soul of liberalism is equally under threat, by the increasingly vociferous claims for recognition...Show moreThe body of liberalism needs defending in a world increasingly hostile to liberal states, but the soul of liberalism is equally under threat, by the increasingly vociferous claims for recognition of group difference from the multicultural milieu, which are often in conflict, within its borders. How must a liberal respond to the conflict of values and claims for special recognition? The central focus of this work is to counter arguments that liberalism ought to respond by promoting personal autonomy, i.e., developing liberal individuals and institutions. Rather, in returning to the foundational basis of liberalism - that the irreducibly individual nature of moral reasoning and the fact of diversity demands liberty of conscience - it reasserts the primacy of the principle of toleration and the corollary freedom of association (and exit), as the only theoretically justifiable and coherent liberal response to diversity. This is founded on the universal human value of living according to, or not against, conscience and the striving for peaceable coexistence. A free society then, is one where different groups, illiberal or otherwise, coexist in mutual toleration and where the relevant individual freedom is the right to live according to conscience (howsoever culturally formed or defined) against external interference and, in circumstances of conflict or dissent, the freedom to exit. The implications of this conclusion are that only norms of civility developed by modus operandi may constrain 'illiberal' cultural practices. The liberal state is not invested with this power any more than it is with authority over moral questions; the state is a tyrant by policy when it is granted that authority by principle.Show less
Political judgement – as defined here – is an intrinsically complex matter. By definition, the moral agent finds himself in a non-conventional setting and is confronted with the immediate necessity...Show morePolitical judgement – as defined here – is an intrinsically complex matter. By definition, the moral agent finds himself in a non-conventional setting and is confronted with the immediate necessity to make a valid judgement in a political spirit. For that purpose, Aristotle’s phronēsis is a promising virtue. Accordingly, this paper develops a phronetic mode of deliberation that accounts for the very characteristics of political judgement. Phronetic judgement enables the moral agent to specify the end – what is good in the particular setting – and then to deliberate about the appropriate means towards this end. That deliberative specification of the end is encouraged does however not imply that phronetic judgement leads to a sort of arbitrary ethics; I argue that in phronetic judgement – correctly understood – the moral agent also considers moral principles in the process of deliberation. Further, it is shown that the phronimos approaches political judgement with an eye for the common good, for the good of others and for justice; consequently, phronetic judgement is reconcilable with the truth of pluralism and the rule of law.Show less
Classifying United Russia, the party in Russia that has the majority of seats in parliament since 2000, proves a challenge. United Russia is called a hegemonic party, a dominant party and sometimes...Show moreClassifying United Russia, the party in Russia that has the majority of seats in parliament since 2000, proves a challenge. United Russia is called a hegemonic party, a dominant party and sometimes a party of power. Some authors even use the three concepts for United Russia in the same article (Bader 2011, White 2011, Hutcheson 2012). For example, White uses all three concepts without explaining them: “ Russia’s dominant party: United Russia, the hegemonic party of power” (2011, 655). Currently, United Russia is addressed as a party of power by many scholars (Roberts 2013, Krastev and Holmes 2012, Oversloot 2006, Protsyk 2003). However, just as many authors consider United Russia to be a dominant party (Slider 2010, Reuters 2010, Remington 2008). Only a few authors call United Russia a cartel party (Hutcheson 2012, White 2012). This indicates that the definitions used to classify parties might not be clear or that the concepts are very close to each other. All three concepts are used differently in the literature and there are not always clear boundaries between these different concepts. Most complicated seems to be the concept of a party of power. Therefore the focus of this thesis will be on the party of power. Some authors use the term party of power and dominant party interchangeably (Sakwa 2012). What does this mean? Is there confusion about the role of United Russia or lays the confusion in the differences between party types? Is there a clear understanding of what the differences are between a party of power and a dominant party, and what the differences are between a party of power and a hegemonic party? Furthermore, do all the authors use the same type in the same way? A type should be used as a clarification of the characteristics of a party. In the case of United Russia authors use different party types to point to the same elements of the party. The opposite does also occur, authors who use the same party type, but point to different traits of the party. It seems that the party types are used superfluously and have a different meaning when used by different authors.Show less
