In november 1946 sloten de Nederlands-Indische overheid en de door Soekarno uitgeroepen Republiek Indonesië het Akkoord van Linggadjati. Hierin spraken zij af om in het kader van de dekolonisatie...Show moreIn november 1946 sloten de Nederlands-Indische overheid en de door Soekarno uitgeroepen Republiek Indonesië het Akkoord van Linggadjati. Hierin spraken zij af om in het kader van de dekolonisatie Indonesië om te vormen naar een federatief verband. Deze federatie zou bestaan uit vier deelstaten: Sumatra, de Republiek, Borneo en Oost-Indonesië. De meest concrete uitvoering van het federale stelsel vond plaats in Oost-Indonesië. In de historische beschouwingen over de dekolonisatie is echter de meeste aandacht uitgegaan naar de interacties tussen de Nederlands-Indische overheid en de Republiek op Java. Vanwege de nauwe focus op de Republiek zijn de politieke processen binnen de deelstaat Oost-Indonesië nauwelijks onderzocht, waardoor de deelstaat Oost-Indonesië vaak beschouwd als niets meer dan sneer richting de Republiek, als troefkaart op de onderhandeltafel, of in het ergste geval als een Nederlandse marionettenstaat. Deze gangbare beschouwingen gaan echter voorbij aan de oprechte poging tot dekolonisatie in Oost-Indonesië. Door de focus te leggen op de Nederlandse bestuursambtenaren en hun Indonesische collega’s ter plaatse ontstaat een nieuw beeld over de werkzaamheden die verricht werden omtrent federalisering en dekolonisatie in de deelstaat Oost-Indonesië. De conclusie van dit onderzoek luidt dat tussen 1946 en 1949 Nederlandse bestuursambtenaren een nieuw politiek systeem poogden op te zetten waarin er daadwerkelijk sprake was van een oprechte poging tot dekolonisatie, en waarbij steeds meer bestuurstaken overgingen op het Indonesische bestuur.Show less
This thesis investigates the impact of fascist ideas and practices on anticolonial nationalism in late colonial Indonesia (primarily 1935-42). Focusing on the example of Partai Indonesia Raya ...Show moreThis thesis investigates the impact of fascist ideas and practices on anticolonial nationalism in late colonial Indonesia (primarily 1935-42). Focusing on the example of Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra) and its youth organization Surya Wirawan, it aims at bringing together disparate historiographies on fascism, anticolonial nationalism, and Indonesian intellectual history. Moreover, it traces the first 'birth pangs' of Indonesian paramilitarism back to the late colonial period, thus arguing against the commonly held view explaining the militarization of Indonesian politics merely as an effect of the Japanese occupation (1942-45). Therefore, this thesis uncovers traces of a 'homegrown' tradition of paramilitarism that drew a considerable part of its inspiration from fascist role models. For the purpose of this study, fascism is applied as a heuristic tool to ask hitherto avoided questions about organizations like Parindra that have long been labeled as 'cooperative' nationalist parties. In doing so, this thesis considers Indonesia as one of the countless (emerging) nations that were receptive to the global fascist hype in the 1930s.Show less
This thesis aims to explore the position and role of Thailand during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The main research questions are: (1) How did the relations, both official and unofficial, between...Show moreThis thesis aims to explore the position and role of Thailand during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The main research questions are: (1) How did the relations, both official and unofficial, between Thailand and Indonesia develop during the Indonesian Revolution? And (2) why did the Thai-Indonesian relations develop in such ways? This thesis argues that Thailand took a hypocritically neutral stance during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Shortly before the conflict ended, Thailand, however, shifted to a pro-Indonesian stance.Show less
‘We shall uphold, the centuries-old tradition of the Dutch Navy, that has already been demonstrated in European waters, this now shall be in service of preserving our regions [in the Far East]’...Show more‘We shall uphold, the centuries-old tradition of the Dutch Navy, that has already been demonstrated in European waters, this now shall be in service of preserving our regions [in the Far East]’ Lieutenant-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Indies forces, wrote on 9 December 1941 after the Dutch Minister of the Navy and the Commander in Chief of the Navy, J.Th. Furstner had wished him the best of luck in the conduct of war against Japan. In reaction to the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour, Malacca and Singapore on 7 December 1941, the Netherlands government had declared itself at war with Japan because of hostile acts against ‘two powers with which the Netherlands entertains most friendly relations’. As early as 1912 the Dutch government had identified Japan as a potential threat to the Netherlands Indies. Therefore the Dutch had designed a fleet program to match the Japanese strength. During the mid-1930s Japan actively started conquering territories in the Far East in order to realize the New Order of Eastern Asia, a confederation of Pacific territories under Japanese leadership. From this point on, the Japanese conquest in Southeast Asia became a great threat to forces with interest in the region, including the United States and Britain, as well as the Dutch, as colonial rulers of the Indonesian archipelago. On the eve of the Second World War the Dutch defence potential was no match for the Japanese forces. Thus, the Dutch started looking for an alliance to withstand a possible conflict in the Pacific theatre with Japan. However, the Dutch had maintained to uphold a longstanding tradition of political neutrality since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and had even managed to stay out of the First World War because of this. But soon it became evident that the policy of neutrality would not keep the Dutch out of the Second World War. So the Dutch had to re-evaluate their position, in order to survive a future conflict. Whereas the upside of the Dutch policy of neutrality was that it had been able to avoid involvement in previous wars, the downside was that they were not prepared to actively take part in a war should one become inevitable. Eventually, after several official and unofficial conferences and talks with the allied parties in the Pacific, and more specifically after the shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, a unified command, called ABDACOM was established on 28 December 1941. ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command) intended to fight the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and to protect the British and the Dutch colonies in this region, as well as the Philippines and Australia. The efforts of ABDACOM to prevent Japan from taking over the Allied controlled territories in the Pacific failed. On 25 February 1942 ABDACOM was dissolved with disastrous consequences for the Allied presence in the Pacific. Two days later, on 27 February the Battle of the Java Sea resulted in a great loss for the Dutch fleet and the eventual loss of the Netherlands Indies. The efforts of the ‘unquenchable soldiers of the British Commonwealth’, ‘the men of MacArthur’ and the ‘band of “indomitable Dutch”, with their Indonesian comrades in arms’ failed to stop the Japanese aggression.Show less
