In 1973, the emergence of all-powerful statesmen in the principal European monarchies was identified by Bérenger as the Euroepan phenomenon of the minister-favourite. In 1999, Elliott and Brockliss...Show moreIn 1973, the emergence of all-powerful statesmen in the principal European monarchies was identified by Bérenger as the Euroepan phenomenon of the minister-favourite. In 1999, Elliott and Brockliss actualized and expanded the understanding of this phenomenon with the help of various scholars and the latest advances in the study of the principal minster-favourites. Taking as a reference the last studies of Orry and Dubois, this paper will analyze their memorials to measure the degree to which the context of the early 18th century promoted the reemergence of the power and state conceptualization held by the original minister-favourites.Show less
This thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat...Show moreThis thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat Khan (1699-1701) and the governorship of Haider Quli Khan (1716-1719). As the years surrounding the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 saw local mutasaddi strengthen their position, the VOC reconsidered its approach to problem-solving. The comparison between these two governorships makes it clear that the VOC displayed a clear preference for a local solution negotiated with the governor. During the governorship of Diânat Khan, reaching out to the emperor was still considered as an option. However, it was seen as a more expensive and less effective alternative that required support from local government officials to work. Two decades later during the governorship of Haider Quli Khan, the VOC made it clear that they had lost faith in the emperor’s authority within Surat. They relied more heavily on the governor than before for matters of security, trade and conflict-resolution. Examining these periods shows that the VOC dealt with a much wider range of officials than often assumed, preferred the efficiency of a deal with the governor over a deal with the emperor, and worked with local government to approach the emperor when local authority was not enough to solve an issue.Show less
Assimilation in colonial African history has often been studied as an active policy. Recent literature has argued that assimilation was instead far more limited and complicated, especially in the...Show moreAssimilation in colonial African history has often been studied as an active policy. Recent literature has argued that assimilation was instead far more limited and complicated, especially in the case of French-Senegal. This thesis therefore examines cultural assimilation as a rhetorical tool rather than as a directly implemented idea, asking: did the French colonial government in Senegal, between 1852 and 1906, consciously implement assimilation processes with the intended purpose of stimulating the general acceptance of French identity in local indigenous groups, or were there other factors involved? A precursory analysis of how the métis of the Four Communes self-gallicised into French mercantile and cultural intermediaries frames the complex historical situation of French-Senegal. The centuries-long public disinterest towards imperial affairs that the métis experienced resulted in certain freedoms, which they used to construct themselves as French intermediaries over a long period of time. This directly contrasts the short-term adjustments to the indigenous status quo undergone by the Toucouleurs of Futa Toro in the late-19th century, after decades of direct and indirect conflict with the French. This paper provides a more complete picture of how assimilation evolved, was viewed, and significantly more limited than 19th and early-20th century ideological rhetoric suggests. Limited intermediary construction emerges instead as the colonial government’s main policy to ensure long-term stability in newly acquired interior regions, imperial competition with other European powers being a key catalyst. While the colonial government did attempt a few instances of direct assimilation, the budgetary and logistical difficulties of enforcing the acceptance of French civilization indicate that this was not in colonial interest. Policy was instead driven to construct effective intermediaries, which allowed the government to focus on the larger issues it had to deal with. This is connected to the initial war against the jihadi Toucouleur Empire, and the continuing threat that both it and its leaders represented. The Toucouleur Empire had control over a significant swath of West Africa, and the ruling Tall dynasty that claimed those territories was a problem for French colonial ambitions. In addition, the predominantly Islamic indigenous group was highly resistant to foreign Europeans, making assimilation all the more difficult and unlikely in the long run. Due to the demands of imperial competition, the French sought to undermine the Toucouleur Empire, and the Tall dynasty that held sway over it. This was successful, in part thanks to manipulation of the geopolitical situation through treaties with local indigenous chiefs and arming Toucouleur rivals - with indigenous geopolitics playing a significant role on its own in causing the decline of the Toucouleur Empire. The colonial government seized Futa Toro in 1890, forcing the Tall dynasty into exile. The years that followed and the policies implemented further suggest that assimilation was limited in French-Senegal, largely relegated to rhetoric that exaggerated events to fit into unrealistic ideological expectations. A form of limited intermediary construction was emphasised instead, as seen in source description of Islamic policies, which sought to restrict the movement of Muslim preachers and curtail the influence of Islam. Due to the cultural importance of the Islamic faith in Futa Toro, this policy intended to favour French civilization as a replacement – but was unsuccessful. This shows the difficulties that the colonial government encountered when it did attempt to enforce the widespread acceptance of French civilization, and by extension identity, in indigenous groups. Information-gathering practises through 19th century military expeditions also highlight that the colonial government was in no position to extensively consolidate French identity in the region. The French had to acquire as much information about local affairs as possible, so that effective policies could be enacted within budgetary restrictions – which they used to guide the writing of treaties. This is tied to the power wielded by the Tall dynasty, which originated from established Islamic traditions such as the hajj. The French, through information-gathering practises, were well aware of these traditions, and sought to limit the ability for the clerical elite to rebel effectively against them in the long-term. The eventual restriction of the hajj was subsequently enacted through enforced treaty terms, ensuring that indigenous elite children would acquire a predominantly French-education. Yet even in these schools, they were able to speak their own language outside of class and attend Qur’anic schools. This was done so that the ruling elite would be gallicised enough to never question colonial rule, yet not French enough to be able to identify themselves as such in any meaningful way – potentially unable to act as effective leaders and intermediaries in their respective communities as a result. Even this process was complicated by conflicting interpretations of assimilation between colonial missionaries and officials, relating to assimilation’s conceptual connection to the European civilizing mission. This thesis therefore concludes that the French colonial government in Senegal, between 1852 and 1906, certainly talked about assimilation in a way that implied they had consciously implemented assimilation processes with the intended purpose of stimulating the general acceptance of French identity in local indigenous groups. Other factors show that this was not the historical reality, however. The colonial government was not able to apply direct assimilation to the same ideological extent as rhetoric portrayed. Rather, over the span of several decades and due to budgetary restrictions, the government focused on applying pragmatic long-term solutions to ensure public order and stability. This conclusion was driven by theoretical and methodological considerations. To ensure that colonial perspectives remained firmly fixed in their context, this thesis was written using a social imaginary approach, permitting this paper to speak more objectively to what occurred within colonial conversations. Importantly, this avoids the assumption that a ‘superior’ civilisation was dictating the terms of interaction in West Africa. In addition, this new approach provides fresh insights and perspectives, allowing this thesis to contribute something new to existing colonial African literature.Show less
Newspapers reveal much more than the facts reported within them. They illustrate revolutionary culture and the climate of ideas which faced readers. Understanding this is crucial to imagining how...Show moreNewspapers reveal much more than the facts reported within them. They illustrate revolutionary culture and the climate of ideas which faced readers. Understanding this is crucial to imagining how people experienced the daily reality of living through such times. Newspapers during the Directory period have seldom been studied. This is a particular lacuna given the crisis and unexpected chaos of the summer of 1799. By mid-1799, multiple military fronts as well as internal unrest backgrounded the beginning of the royalist rebellion in the Haute-Garonne. The way in which the press characterised this royalist threat and communicated the crisis discloses much about what editors, and in turn their readership, were afraid of happening. Editors relied on collective memories of the horrors of the Terror to characterise opposing political factions thereby demonstrating fears of repeating the recent past. Contrasting this dire rhetoric and the extreme demonisation of the rebels with actual indifferent government attitude to the insurrection illustrates that this was merely a form of propaganda employed for political ends by the Jacobin, royalist, and republican political movements. In the same vein, the post-rebellion manipulation of the depiction of peasant rebels once again establishes that these words were more motivated by political needs than by reality. This reveals an underlying anxiety from a Directory whose control over France was steadily eroding.Show less
