Abstract In 2012, China established the 17+1-forum together with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It combined the forum in 2015 with the Belt and Road Initiative, an enormous Chinese...Show moreAbstract In 2012, China established the 17+1-forum together with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It combined the forum in 2015 with the Belt and Road Initiative, an enormous Chinese infrastructure investment project. The EU deems the forum problematic because it divides Member States (MSs) in terms of relations with China, preventing the EU from taking a common position on China. The EU fears that this and other consequences will deteriorate its functioning and security. However, despite the EU’s fears, twelve EU MSs still participate in the forum. This raises an important question: Why do governments of BRI-17+1-forum participants that are also EU MSs choose to cooperate with China, despite that the EU fears that this will deteriorate its functioning and security? The literature gives several arguments for this, but this thesis will only test whether one of these arguments, whether these EU MSs have come to see cooperation with China in the forum as “a viable alternative to the EU project” respectively, is a valid answer to this question. Based on case studies of Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia and the application of shelter theory, it is concluded that this argument played a role in the decision of these countries to participate in the BRI-17+1-forum. However, the study also shows that Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Slovakia, have started to consider the forum less important because expectations are not met and because of the risks involved in cooperating with China.Show less
