Despite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on...Show moreDespite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on alliance formation in the Middle East. This thesis highlights the limits of Western-centric theories when applied on non-Western regions. In doing so, this thesis focuses on one crucial non-Western region, the Middle East, and asks if the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of threat, balance-ofpower and ideological solidarity) can explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, if so to what extent, and if not what an alternative could be. It researches this question through the systematic exploration of one topical moment of Middle East contemporary history, which caused major regional realignment in the region: The First Gulf War in 1990. The findings of the case study, show that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance the external threat (of Iraq threatening the status quo after invading Kuwait) as well as internal threats (of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region). Therefore, this thesis will argue that the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories cannot explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as these theories only take external threats into account. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats may it explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The ‘regime security’ approach of Ryan is, therefore, considered to be a suitable alternative approach, as it examines ruling regimes and their insecurities, considering external as well as internal threats. Nevertheless, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the external influence coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies have on state behaviour of other states. Every state was externally influenced through these strategies, leading them to join the U.N. coalition or declare neutrality with large repercussions. This has not been discussed in alliance formation literature before. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well as the definitions do not hold up in a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East where states have large differences in military capabilities.Show less
The enhancement of the revolutionary ideology promoted by Hezbollah during the Arab Uprisings was challenged when in 2011 the protests began in the city of Deraa in Syria. Hezbollah’s support of...Show moreThe enhancement of the revolutionary ideology promoted by Hezbollah during the Arab Uprisings was challenged when in 2011 the protests began in the city of Deraa in Syria. Hezbollah’s support of the revolutionary nature and ideology of the opposition movements became an issue when the anti-government demonstrations began in Syria and the organization suddenly contradicted its previous posture by backing the regime.The Janus-faced behavior of the organization had an immediate negative impact on the image that Hezbollah had been building through a pragmatic and selective legitimation process. In this scenario, how does Hezbollah react to the challenges to the legitimacy of its organization?. In light of the aforementioned, this thesis will aim to analyze and identify the way in which Hezbollah justify the intervention in Syria to their support groups at the local, national and international level. This research focuses on Hezbollah’s creation of 4 meaning in the ideological discourse in order to justify their actions and preserve their legitimacy at three different levels of target audiences (communal, national, international) by developing diverse context models (van Dijk, 2006, 21) according to each audience’s particular interests.Show less
This thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have...Show moreThis thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have relegated the importance of primordial attachments in their attempts at building a “nation” and, instead, endeavoured to construct “Kurdistani” national identifications primarily founded on a sense of common history and civic rights. This thesis argues that such a construction is primarily grounded in political pragmatism. The ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq requires non-primordial identity markers to be formulated and promoted by the KDP and PUK to define their national identification and distinguish the Kurds of the KRG from “others”, thereby supporting claims for political autonomy. It is political calculations – both at the domestic and international levels – that have influenced top-down constructions of a “Kurdish nation” as distinct from two specific political “others”: i) Iraq under Baghdad’s government; and ii) Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran and Syria. This was particularly crucial in the period following the 2003 US-led invasion, when Iraq began its transition from dictatorship to federal democracy, reinforcing KDP and PUK hegemony over the Kurdistan Region. Throughout this thesis, I highlight how KDP and PUK narratives of victimhood have underpinned the construction of Baghdad as the “unjust” and “threatening” other, whereas emphasis on civic values as allegedly embedded in the “Kurdistani identity” have distinguished them from other Kurds, in order to enhance relations with neighbouring states such as Turkey and Iran, and influential state actors such as the USA and EU members.Show less
