This thesis analyses the considerations of British officials when arriving at positions on granting sovereignty/ authority to: (i) the Greeks in Smyrna, southwest Anatolia; (ii) the Armenians...Show moreThis thesis analyses the considerations of British officials when arriving at positions on granting sovereignty/ authority to: (i) the Greeks in Smyrna, southwest Anatolia; (ii) the Armenians within north-eastern Anatolia; (iii) the Kurds within south-eastern Anatolia; (iv) and the Kurds within the Mosul vilayet (Southern Kurdistan/ present-day northern Iraq), from 1918-1926. The concepts of “Orientalism” and “civilisation” provide the theoretical basis and are applied to the sources analysed. The thesis argues that Britain’s actions were influenced by the prevailing stereotypes of each people and “civilisation”, but ultimately rooted in political and economic interest. The Paris Peace Conference presented an opportunity to strengthen Britain’s position in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East through support for the design of friendly states and re-drawing the political map of the territory within the former Ottoman empire. Each case was part of the process of erecting a new imperial structure in the Middle East. This new structure was to be based upon the organising principle of ethnic nationalism, as promoted by the Allied powers, including Britain. The British role in each case can be described as: the leading supporter of Greek goals in Anatolia; predominantly a supportive observer of Armenian goals in Anatolia, leaving the French to play the role of lead supporter; a cautiously supportive observer of the Anatolian Kurds with little authority outside of its dictation of the Treaty of Sèvres; and a cautious detractor of the autonomy of southern Kurds, having occupied the Mosul vilayet in 1918 and held full colonial authority over it, experimenting with autonomy but ultimately deciding on its abandonment. By 1926, the goals of the Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan had not been achieved, and all had withered away in British Middle Eastern policy.Show less
This thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have...Show moreThis thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have relegated the importance of primordial attachments in their attempts at building a “nation” and, instead, endeavoured to construct “Kurdistani” national identifications primarily founded on a sense of common history and civic rights. This thesis argues that such a construction is primarily grounded in political pragmatism. The ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq requires non-primordial identity markers to be formulated and promoted by the KDP and PUK to define their national identification and distinguish the Kurds of the KRG from “others”, thereby supporting claims for political autonomy. It is political calculations – both at the domestic and international levels – that have influenced top-down constructions of a “Kurdish nation” as distinct from two specific political “others”: i) Iraq under Baghdad’s government; and ii) Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran and Syria. This was particularly crucial in the period following the 2003 US-led invasion, when Iraq began its transition from dictatorship to federal democracy, reinforcing KDP and PUK hegemony over the Kurdistan Region. Throughout this thesis, I highlight how KDP and PUK narratives of victimhood have underpinned the construction of Baghdad as the “unjust” and “threatening” other, whereas emphasis on civic values as allegedly embedded in the “Kurdistani identity” have distinguished them from other Kurds, in order to enhance relations with neighbouring states such as Turkey and Iran, and influential state actors such as the USA and EU members.Show less
