Customary law in South Africa was transformed by its incorporation into the colonial and later Apartheid state. In this regard, the work of colonial administrators and scholars were important as...Show moreCustomary law in South Africa was transformed by its incorporation into the colonial and later Apartheid state. In this regard, the work of colonial administrators and scholars were important as their visions of idealised ‘tribal’ society and chiefly rule with despotic and patriarchal qualities were often largely reproduced in official state policy, and served to legitimate white minority rule. Literature on this subject has tended to either be situated within a national narrative, or largely focus on British policies of indirect rule. Tracing the career and thought of F.D. ‘Frits’ Holleman in the first half of the 20th Century, as he moved from judicial and scholarly appointments in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), to posts at Leiden University in the Netherlands and ultimately Stellenbosch University in South Africa, allows for a more explicitly global approach to the subject. It also demonstrates an insufficiently-acknowledged transfer of Dutch colonial expertise and experience from an established body of Indonesian adat law scholarship, originating at Leiden University, to an emerging field of customary law scholarship in the strongly Afrikaner Nationalist environment of Stellenbosch. While Holleman’s work on South African customary law was in some ways distinct from what he had worked on before, many of the concepts and characteristics he ascribed to African societies were straightforwardly transposed from his work on adat law, which stood within a tradition of scholarship that demonstrated both paternal/empathic concern for protecting non-Western law, and a strong essentialising impulse, leading to broad and enduring generalisations about supposedly ‘primitive’ societies. Beyond Holleman’s own trajectory, this study holds broader significance in the way it demonstrates the spread of theories of adat law far beyond their place of origin, and their influence on South African thinking about customary law. Moreover, the structural factors which allowed Holleman and his ideas to travel, suggest connections far deeper than a single individual; Holleman’s case has implications for how we think about the ongoing relationship between the Netherlands and South Africa, and indeed a triangular relationship between the Netherlands, Indonesia and South Africa. It may also offer a new lens with which to view the revival of traditionalist politics in both South Africa and Indonesia.Show less
This research analyzes the Dutch reactions in the Netherlands East Indies to the growing amount of Chinese migrants entering the colony in the period 1880-1912. Through a focus on immigration...Show moreThis research analyzes the Dutch reactions in the Netherlands East Indies to the growing amount of Chinese migrants entering the colony in the period 1880-1912. Through a focus on immigration policies, public opinion in Indies newspapers, fingerprinting policies, diplomacy with China, consular representation and discussions on nationality, this research explains why the Netherlands East Indies as a colonial state could not close its borders for Chinese migrants, even when considering anti-Chinese immigration policies were a global phenomenon in this period. As this research shows, both the specific nature of the Dutch colonial state and the increasing diplomatic pressure from China were important factors in how Dutch immigration policies were shaped.Show less
‘We shall uphold, the centuries-old tradition of the Dutch Navy, that has already been demonstrated in European waters, this now shall be in service of preserving our regions [in the Far East]’...Show more‘We shall uphold, the centuries-old tradition of the Dutch Navy, that has already been demonstrated in European waters, this now shall be in service of preserving our regions [in the Far East]’ Lieutenant-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Indies forces, wrote on 9 December 1941 after the Dutch Minister of the Navy and the Commander in Chief of the Navy, J.Th. Furstner had wished him the best of luck in the conduct of war against Japan. In reaction to the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour, Malacca and Singapore on 7 December 1941, the Netherlands government had declared itself at war with Japan because of hostile acts against ‘two powers with which the Netherlands entertains most friendly relations’. As early as 1912 the Dutch government had identified Japan as a potential threat to the Netherlands Indies. Therefore the Dutch had designed a fleet program to match the Japanese strength. During the mid-1930s Japan actively started conquering territories in the Far East in order to realize the New Order of Eastern Asia, a confederation of Pacific territories under Japanese leadership. From this point on, the Japanese conquest in Southeast Asia became a great threat to forces with interest in the region, including the United States and Britain, as well as the Dutch, as colonial rulers of the Indonesian archipelago. On the eve of the Second World War the Dutch defence potential was no match for the Japanese forces. Thus, the Dutch started looking for an alliance to withstand a possible conflict in the Pacific theatre with Japan. However, the Dutch had maintained to uphold a longstanding tradition of political neutrality since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and had even managed to stay out of the First World War because of this. But soon it became evident that the policy of neutrality would not keep the Dutch out of the Second World War. So the Dutch had to re-evaluate their position, in order to survive a future conflict. Whereas the upside of the Dutch policy of neutrality was that it had been able to avoid involvement in previous wars, the downside was that they were not prepared to actively take part in a war should one become inevitable. Eventually, after several official and unofficial conferences and talks with the allied parties in the Pacific, and more specifically after the shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, a unified command, called ABDACOM was established on 28 December 1941. ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command) intended to fight the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and to protect the British and the Dutch colonies in this region, as well as the Philippines and Australia. The efforts of ABDACOM to prevent Japan from taking over the Allied controlled territories in the Pacific failed. On 25 February 1942 ABDACOM was dissolved with disastrous consequences for the Allied presence in the Pacific. Two days later, on 27 February the Battle of the Java Sea resulted in a great loss for the Dutch fleet and the eventual loss of the Netherlands Indies. The efforts of the ‘unquenchable soldiers of the British Commonwealth’, ‘the men of MacArthur’ and the ‘band of “indomitable Dutch”, with their Indonesian comrades in arms’ failed to stop the Japanese aggression.Show less
Research master thesis | History: Societies and Institutions (research) (MA)
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This thesis describes and analyzes the famine that occurred in the Netherlands East Indies, c. 1900-1904. The famine affected Java and parts of the Outer Islands. It details (the principles behind)...Show moreThis thesis describes and analyzes the famine that occurred in the Netherlands East Indies, c. 1900-1904. The famine affected Java and parts of the Outer Islands. It details (the principles behind) the relief efforts of the Dutch colonial government. It also analyzes how the colonial government used the famine to accumulate knowledge on the subject, while politically representing and justifying its response. The thesis argues that famines and food shortages are integral to understanding the colonial state and colonial society. Further, it takes a comparative perspective by connecting the famine to famine experiences of other colonial powers in British India and French Indochina.Show less
