In 1684, amidst calls for reform and action against corruption, the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) appointed a ‘Committee of Redress’ and dispatched Commissioner General, Hendrik...Show moreIn 1684, amidst calls for reform and action against corruption, the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) appointed a ‘Committee of Redress’ and dispatched Commissioner General, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede, to inspect VOC trade posts and their staff in Asia’s ‘Western Quarters’, which includes Coromandel. This study is an attempt to determine the extent to which van Reede’s actions and decisions in Coromandel can be justified within the framework of the Committee’s original objectives, given how this is not satisfactorily explained in extant historiography. Further, the dominant view in extant literature on this subject is that the VOC directors’ ulterior motive for setting up this Committee was to replace those in Coromandel linked to the Rijckloff van Goens Sr. faction with those linked to their own. Therefore, this study also takes factionalism across the VOC’s rank and file into account. To answer the overarching question, this study relies substantially on archival research and literature review. Archival material considered for this study includes VOC records such as interrogations, statements, missives, and reports, as well as correspondence between van Reede, the VOC directors, and the VOC leadership in ‘Batavia’. This reveals two points of note. First, that van Reede was carefully balancing between serving the interests of the VOC directors and his own; and second, that he did not specifically target the van Goens Sr. faction in Coromandel.Show less
This thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat...Show moreThis thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat Khan (1699-1701) and the governorship of Haider Quli Khan (1716-1719). As the years surrounding the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 saw local mutasaddi strengthen their position, the VOC reconsidered its approach to problem-solving. The comparison between these two governorships makes it clear that the VOC displayed a clear preference for a local solution negotiated with the governor. During the governorship of Diânat Khan, reaching out to the emperor was still considered as an option. However, it was seen as a more expensive and less effective alternative that required support from local government officials to work. Two decades later during the governorship of Haider Quli Khan, the VOC made it clear that they had lost faith in the emperor’s authority within Surat. They relied more heavily on the governor than before for matters of security, trade and conflict-resolution. Examining these periods shows that the VOC dealt with a much wider range of officials than often assumed, preferred the efficiency of a deal with the governor over a deal with the emperor, and worked with local government to approach the emperor when local authority was not enough to solve an issue.Show less
