Dworkin’s non-ideal theory of justice has been criticized for its lack of practical guidance and for being insufficiently consistent with the normative framework developed in his ideal theory. The...Show moreDworkin’s non-ideal theory of justice has been criticized for its lack of practical guidance and for being insufficiently consistent with the normative framework developed in his ideal theory. The ideal/non-ideal distinction has gotten a lot of attention in the past decades and recent literature points to the need to focus on the implementation of theories of justice in non-ideal circumstances (Wolff, 1998; Anderson, 1999; Arneson, 2000; Farelly, 2007; Swift, 2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Robeyns, 2008). Is there a way in which we can overcome the criticism of Dworkin and live up to the demand of a satisfying theory of justice that has a coherent and sound ideal and non-ideal component? By critically analysing the primary problems residing in either the ideal-, non-ideal theory or the relation between them I will aim to identify the main obstacles to the solvation of the ideal/non-ideal dichotomy. First of all I will argue that ideal- and non-ideal theory each have a distinct value and that their strength can be combined to realize a complete and satisfactory theory of justice. Subsequently, Dworkin’s ideal and non-ideal theory will be set forth in order to find out which aspects are problematic. Thereafter, in the following order, four different objections will be discussed resulting in four claims about Dworkin’s theory of justice. First of all the ‘shameful revelation’ objection will be addressed that claims any non-ideal implementation of Dworkin’s ideal theory will lead to immoral implications. Secondly, bad idealization will be exposed that allegedly obstruct the translation from ideal- to non-ideal theory. Thirdly, the negative impact of the controversial place of liberty in Dworkin’s ideal theory will be discussed. And finally the interpretation of the equity deficit in Dworkin’s asserted insufficient non-ideal theory of improvement will be scrutinized. In the end each claim tells us something about the way in which the apparent dichotomy between ideal- and non-ideal theory in Dworkin’s theory of justice can be resolved and lays out the first baby steps towards an improved and more coherent Dworkian theory of justice.Show less
