This paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human...Show moreThis paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human behaviour for over two millennia. Most literature treats akrasia as an isolated instance of a weak will. However, unlike most approaches, this thesis aims to reconceptualise akrasia as a character trait based on the tripartite relationship between its recurrence, self-deception, and self-control. The proposed view sees recurrent akratic behaviour as an essential factor in that process, which is often overlooked. Agents repeatedly fail to adhere to their better judgement, which supports the hypothesis of reconceptualising akrasia as a trait since it isn’t a one-time event but part of a person’s character. In this process of rethinking akrasia as a trait, self-deception is conscripted against the agent’s better judgment. This creates a bidirectional relationship between akrasia and self-deception, allowing the agents to deceive themselves and further reinforce both. Over time, as the juncture between akrasia and self- deception becomes stronger, it undermines the agent’s self-control. As the two manifest, the agent’s ability to develop and maintain self-control is hindered, reinforcing akratic behaviour.Show less
